Donald Trump was correct about Bush lies back March 2007
Friday, May 30, 2008
Geotermia Polska czy uzaleznienie od energii zagranicznej?
Geotermia Polska czy uzaleznienie od energii zagranicznej?
Fundusz ekologiczny czy polityczny?
Nasz Dziennik, 2008-05-30
Jeśli do 2010 roku Polska nie wywiąże się z międzynarodowych zobowiązań odnośnie do pozyskiwania energii z zasobów odnawialnych, to będziemy płacili potężną karę - rocznie ponad miliard euro
Unieważnienie przez Narodowy Fundusz Ochrony Środowiska i Gospodarki Wodnej umowy z Fundacją "Lux Veritatis" dotyczącej inwestycji geotermalnych w Toruniu może w przyszłości skutkować nałożeniem na Polskę kar w związku z niewypełnieniem minimalnego limitu energii pochodzącej ze źródeł odnawialnych - ostrzegają specjaliści od energii odnawialnej. Inni eksperci z kolei zauważają polityczny charakter tej decyzji. Listy protestacyjne w tej sprawie wystosowała grupa posłów do Parlamentu Europejskiego, kierując je do premiera, prezesa NFOŚiGW oraz unijnych komisarzy ds. ochrony środowiska i energii.
W przekonaniu prof. dr. hab. Ryszarda Kozłowskiego z Instytutu Inżynierii Materiałowej Politechniki Krakowskiej, decyzja Narodowego Funduszu Ochrony Środowiska i Gospodarki Wodnej dotycząca inwestycji geotermalnych w Toruniu może spowodować, że nasz kraj nie wypełni zobowiązań międzynarodowych. - W 2010 roku Polska nie wywiąże się z zobowiązania międzynarodowego odnośnie do pozyskiwania energii z zasobów odnawialnych. Jak obliczyli Niemcy, będziemy płacili karę 70 euro za megawatogodzinę w stosunku do mocy brakującej. Ponieważ prawdopodobnie będzie nam brakowało 5 proc. z 34 tys. megawatów energii elektrycznej, którą Polska dysponuje, to w skali roku zapłacimy karę w wysokości ponad 1 mld euro (1705 proc. naszego przyszłego niedoboru energii odnawialnej pomnożone przez 70 euro, 365 dni i 24 godziny) - alarmuje profesor Kozłowski. - Dziwne, ale rząd tym się nie przejmuje. Woli zapłacić karę, niż uruchomić najtańszą produkcję energii. Bo w Europie jest ona właśnie najtańszą energią - dodaje profesor.
Profesor Kozłowski jest zbulwersowany decyzją Funduszu, która kłóci się z przedwyborczymi obietnicami premiera Donalda Tuska. - Premier Tusk podczas kampanii wyborczej obiecywał Polakom będącym na emigracji, że będą mogli wrócić do kraju. My właśnie uważamy, że przy takim jednym centrum geoenergetycznym może powstać kilkaset miejsc pracy. Jeżeli premier Tusk pozbywa się takiej możliwości - jest to dla nas zupełnie niezrozumiałe - dodaje naukowiec.
W związku z wypowiedzeniem umowy Fundacji "Lux Veritatis" na realizację inwestycji geotermalnej dla Torunia grupa posłów do Parlamentu Europejskiego (Urszula Krupa, Witold Tomczak, Bogdan Pęk, Bogusław Rogalski, Andrzej Zapałowski) oraz poseł Anna Sobecka przesłała listy protestacyjne do premiera, prezesa NFOŚiGW oraz unijnych komisarzy ds. ochrony środowiska i energii. Zwracając się do Jana Rączki, prezesa Funduszu, z apelem o uczciwą analizę sprawy i podjęcie działań uchylających "wybitnie szkodliwą i krótkowzroczną" decyzję, sygnatariusze pisma zaznaczają: "(...) decyzja podjęta przez Narodowy Fundusz Ochrony Środowiska i Gospodarki Wodnej dziwi także ze względu na to, jak wskazują sami urzędnicy, że nie wykorzystuje się wszystkich pieniędzy, które miały być wydatkowane na odnawialne źródła energii, w tym na geotermię, co więcej, nie ma chętnych, by realizować geotermię w naszym kraju, a decyzja była sprawdzana pod względem merytorycznym, formalnym i celowościowym. Jeszcze w styczniu wyniki kontroli Ministerstwa Środowiska w Narodowym Funduszu Ochrony Środowiska i Gospodarki Wodnej wykazały, że nie ma żadnych przeszkód, by Fundacja 'Lux Veritatis' mogła realizować przedsięwzięcie".
Poza nie merytoryczną decyzją NFOŚiGW, niezrozumiałą z punktu widzenia ekonomicznego, dochodzą podejrzenia o celowe działania mające dyskryminować społeczność katolicką w Polsce. Profesor dr hab. Piotr Jaroszyński, kierownik Katedry Filozofii Kultury Katolickiego Uniwersytetu Lubelskiego, uważa - podobnie jak zarząd Fundacji "Lux Veritatis" - że decyzja Funduszu to realizacja przedwyborczych zapowiedzi premiera Donalda Tuska. - Tak, ten jegomość, gdy chodzi o konstruktywne obietnice przedwyborcze, to jak widać gołym okiem, żartował, natomiast jeśli chodzi o zapowiedzi destruktywne, to robi to poważnie. Podstawy jego programu działania politycznego sprowadzają się do niszczenia katolicyzmu w Polsce. Dlatego dostał tak potężne wsparcie antykatolickich mediów - zaznacza.
Komu przeszkadza geotermia
Również minister ochrony środowiska w rządzie Jarosława Kaczyńskiego, a obecnie poseł Prawa i Sprawiedliwości prof. Jan Szyszko nie może doszukać się merytorycznych podstaw dla decyzji Funduszu. - Dziwne jest to, że obecny rząd, dyskutując o tzw. pakiecie energetycznym, zobowiązuje się do tego, aby 20 proc. energii pochodziło z odnawialnych źródeł i jednocześnie nie robi nic ku temu, aby wykorzystać polskie szanse w tym kierunku. Muszę powiedzieć, że jestem zbulwersowany decyzją NFOŚiGW, gdyż geotermia w Polsce zawsze była blokowana - zauważa profesor, gość środowego programu "Polski punkt widzenia" w Telewizji Trwam. - Ona była blokowana - tak przypuszczam - przez tych, którzy uważają, że geotermia zawsze może być bardzo konkurencyjna w stosunku do innych źródeł energii - dodaje Jan Szyszko.
Zdziwienia decyzją NFOŚiGW nie kryje Kazimierz Kujda, były prezes zarządu Funduszu. Zwraca uwagę na staranne spełnienie przez Fundację wszystkich warunków niezbędnych do zawarcia umowy. - Zachowaliśmy staranność wyjątkową. Wszystkie procedury, jakie obowiązywały w NFOŚiGW, zostały zachowane - stwierdza. Zdaniem Kujdy, zastosowanie tak rygorystycznych procedur, które stosuje się tylko w odniesieniu do środków unijnych, to efekt nieprzychylnej dla inwestycji kampanii medialnej. Warto przypomnieć, że wszystkie warunki zostały przez Fundację "Lux Veritatis" spełnione.
W opinii o. Jana Króla CSsR, którą wyraził w "Polskim punkcie widzenia", decyzja Funduszu o unieważnieniu umowy ma charakter polityczny. Przypomniał on wcześniejsze rzucanie kłód pod nogi tej inwestycji, zgodne zresztą z zapowiedziami premiera Donalda Tuska.
Platforma chciała wykorzystać zmianę prowincjała Warszawskiej Prowincji Redemptorystów i już trzeciego dnia po objęciu przez o. Ryszarda Bożka funkcji prowincjała, w niedzielę, przyjechali do Tuchowa prezes i wiceprezes Funduszu. Najwyraźniej liczono na to, że nowy prowincjał nie zdążył się jeszcze zapoznać ze szczegółami inwestycji i będzie można wykorzystać tę sytuację. Plan spalił na panewce - stąd wtorkowe wypowiedzenie umowy. - Jak urząd prowincjała redemptorystów objął o. Ryszard Bożek, otrzymuje on telefon z Warszawy od nowego już pana prezesa NFOŚiGW z prośbą o spotkanie. Oczywiście ojciec jeszcze kilka dni jest wtedy w Tuchowie, trzysta parę kilometrów od Warszawy, i ja dopiero teraz się zastanawiam, jak to się dzieje, że pan prezes i pani wiceprezes jadą tam, te trzysta kilometrów w niedzielę - nie w dniu pracy. Oczywiście ja nie chcę dziś jeszcze mówić o tym, czego dotyczyła rozmowa, myślę, że przyjdzie na to czas - podsumował o. Jan Król.
Jacek Dytkowski
Fundusz ekologiczny czy polityczny?
Nasz Dziennik, 2008-05-30
Jeśli do 2010 roku Polska nie wywiąże się z międzynarodowych zobowiązań odnośnie do pozyskiwania energii z zasobów odnawialnych, to będziemy płacili potężną karę - rocznie ponad miliard euro
Unieważnienie przez Narodowy Fundusz Ochrony Środowiska i Gospodarki Wodnej umowy z Fundacją "Lux Veritatis" dotyczącej inwestycji geotermalnych w Toruniu może w przyszłości skutkować nałożeniem na Polskę kar w związku z niewypełnieniem minimalnego limitu energii pochodzącej ze źródeł odnawialnych - ostrzegają specjaliści od energii odnawialnej. Inni eksperci z kolei zauważają polityczny charakter tej decyzji. Listy protestacyjne w tej sprawie wystosowała grupa posłów do Parlamentu Europejskiego, kierując je do premiera, prezesa NFOŚiGW oraz unijnych komisarzy ds. ochrony środowiska i energii.
W przekonaniu prof. dr. hab. Ryszarda Kozłowskiego z Instytutu Inżynierii Materiałowej Politechniki Krakowskiej, decyzja Narodowego Funduszu Ochrony Środowiska i Gospodarki Wodnej dotycząca inwestycji geotermalnych w Toruniu może spowodować, że nasz kraj nie wypełni zobowiązań międzynarodowych. - W 2010 roku Polska nie wywiąże się z zobowiązania międzynarodowego odnośnie do pozyskiwania energii z zasobów odnawialnych. Jak obliczyli Niemcy, będziemy płacili karę 70 euro za megawatogodzinę w stosunku do mocy brakującej. Ponieważ prawdopodobnie będzie nam brakowało 5 proc. z 34 tys. megawatów energii elektrycznej, którą Polska dysponuje, to w skali roku zapłacimy karę w wysokości ponad 1 mld euro (1705 proc. naszego przyszłego niedoboru energii odnawialnej pomnożone przez 70 euro, 365 dni i 24 godziny) - alarmuje profesor Kozłowski. - Dziwne, ale rząd tym się nie przejmuje. Woli zapłacić karę, niż uruchomić najtańszą produkcję energii. Bo w Europie jest ona właśnie najtańszą energią - dodaje profesor.
Profesor Kozłowski jest zbulwersowany decyzją Funduszu, która kłóci się z przedwyborczymi obietnicami premiera Donalda Tuska. - Premier Tusk podczas kampanii wyborczej obiecywał Polakom będącym na emigracji, że będą mogli wrócić do kraju. My właśnie uważamy, że przy takim jednym centrum geoenergetycznym może powstać kilkaset miejsc pracy. Jeżeli premier Tusk pozbywa się takiej możliwości - jest to dla nas zupełnie niezrozumiałe - dodaje naukowiec.
W związku z wypowiedzeniem umowy Fundacji "Lux Veritatis" na realizację inwestycji geotermalnej dla Torunia grupa posłów do Parlamentu Europejskiego (Urszula Krupa, Witold Tomczak, Bogdan Pęk, Bogusław Rogalski, Andrzej Zapałowski) oraz poseł Anna Sobecka przesłała listy protestacyjne do premiera, prezesa NFOŚiGW oraz unijnych komisarzy ds. ochrony środowiska i energii. Zwracając się do Jana Rączki, prezesa Funduszu, z apelem o uczciwą analizę sprawy i podjęcie działań uchylających "wybitnie szkodliwą i krótkowzroczną" decyzję, sygnatariusze pisma zaznaczają: "(...) decyzja podjęta przez Narodowy Fundusz Ochrony Środowiska i Gospodarki Wodnej dziwi także ze względu na to, jak wskazują sami urzędnicy, że nie wykorzystuje się wszystkich pieniędzy, które miały być wydatkowane na odnawialne źródła energii, w tym na geotermię, co więcej, nie ma chętnych, by realizować geotermię w naszym kraju, a decyzja była sprawdzana pod względem merytorycznym, formalnym i celowościowym. Jeszcze w styczniu wyniki kontroli Ministerstwa Środowiska w Narodowym Funduszu Ochrony Środowiska i Gospodarki Wodnej wykazały, że nie ma żadnych przeszkód, by Fundacja 'Lux Veritatis' mogła realizować przedsięwzięcie".
Poza nie merytoryczną decyzją NFOŚiGW, niezrozumiałą z punktu widzenia ekonomicznego, dochodzą podejrzenia o celowe działania mające dyskryminować społeczność katolicką w Polsce. Profesor dr hab. Piotr Jaroszyński, kierownik Katedry Filozofii Kultury Katolickiego Uniwersytetu Lubelskiego, uważa - podobnie jak zarząd Fundacji "Lux Veritatis" - że decyzja Funduszu to realizacja przedwyborczych zapowiedzi premiera Donalda Tuska. - Tak, ten jegomość, gdy chodzi o konstruktywne obietnice przedwyborcze, to jak widać gołym okiem, żartował, natomiast jeśli chodzi o zapowiedzi destruktywne, to robi to poważnie. Podstawy jego programu działania politycznego sprowadzają się do niszczenia katolicyzmu w Polsce. Dlatego dostał tak potężne wsparcie antykatolickich mediów - zaznacza.
Komu przeszkadza geotermia
Również minister ochrony środowiska w rządzie Jarosława Kaczyńskiego, a obecnie poseł Prawa i Sprawiedliwości prof. Jan Szyszko nie może doszukać się merytorycznych podstaw dla decyzji Funduszu. - Dziwne jest to, że obecny rząd, dyskutując o tzw. pakiecie energetycznym, zobowiązuje się do tego, aby 20 proc. energii pochodziło z odnawialnych źródeł i jednocześnie nie robi nic ku temu, aby wykorzystać polskie szanse w tym kierunku. Muszę powiedzieć, że jestem zbulwersowany decyzją NFOŚiGW, gdyż geotermia w Polsce zawsze była blokowana - zauważa profesor, gość środowego programu "Polski punkt widzenia" w Telewizji Trwam. - Ona była blokowana - tak przypuszczam - przez tych, którzy uważają, że geotermia zawsze może być bardzo konkurencyjna w stosunku do innych źródeł energii - dodaje Jan Szyszko.
Zdziwienia decyzją NFOŚiGW nie kryje Kazimierz Kujda, były prezes zarządu Funduszu. Zwraca uwagę na staranne spełnienie przez Fundację wszystkich warunków niezbędnych do zawarcia umowy. - Zachowaliśmy staranność wyjątkową. Wszystkie procedury, jakie obowiązywały w NFOŚiGW, zostały zachowane - stwierdza. Zdaniem Kujdy, zastosowanie tak rygorystycznych procedur, które stosuje się tylko w odniesieniu do środków unijnych, to efekt nieprzychylnej dla inwestycji kampanii medialnej. Warto przypomnieć, że wszystkie warunki zostały przez Fundację "Lux Veritatis" spełnione.
W opinii o. Jana Króla CSsR, którą wyraził w "Polskim punkcie widzenia", decyzja Funduszu o unieważnieniu umowy ma charakter polityczny. Przypomniał on wcześniejsze rzucanie kłód pod nogi tej inwestycji, zgodne zresztą z zapowiedziami premiera Donalda Tuska.
Platforma chciała wykorzystać zmianę prowincjała Warszawskiej Prowincji Redemptorystów i już trzeciego dnia po objęciu przez o. Ryszarda Bożka funkcji prowincjała, w niedzielę, przyjechali do Tuchowa prezes i wiceprezes Funduszu. Najwyraźniej liczono na to, że nowy prowincjał nie zdążył się jeszcze zapoznać ze szczegółami inwestycji i będzie można wykorzystać tę sytuację. Plan spalił na panewce - stąd wtorkowe wypowiedzenie umowy. - Jak urząd prowincjała redemptorystów objął o. Ryszard Bożek, otrzymuje on telefon z Warszawy od nowego już pana prezesa NFOŚiGW z prośbą o spotkanie. Oczywiście ojciec jeszcze kilka dni jest wtedy w Tuchowie, trzysta parę kilometrów od Warszawy, i ja dopiero teraz się zastanawiam, jak to się dzieje, że pan prezes i pani wiceprezes jadą tam, te trzysta kilometrów w niedzielę - nie w dniu pracy. Oczywiście ja nie chcę dziś jeszcze mówić o tym, czego dotyczyła rozmowa, myślę, że przyjdzie na to czas - podsumował o. Jan Król.
Jacek Dytkowski
Thursday, May 29, 2008
German and Jewish claims For compensation from Poland. Must Poland continue to pay for Hitler's war?
German and Jewish claims For compensation from Poland. Must Poland continue to pay for Hitler's war?
Rabin kontra prof. Nowak
Encouraged by Rabbi Israel Singer's, the General Secretary of the World Jewish Congress, statements in 1996 such as " If Poland does not satisfy Jewish claims, it will be publicly attacked and humiliated in the international forum." So it is a plan to deliberately slander Poland's name and manipulate the American public's opinion against Poles. It was permitted to slander Poles now
Poland's geographical location has made it easy for aggressive peoples and countries to invade it and try to make of Poles a countryless nation. These invasions have cost Poland trillions of dollars in damage. Between 1939-1989 Poland was in the grip of two colonial powers: Nazi Germany in the Second World War, and the Soviet Union during and after the war. Poles are proud to have resisted both invasions, and this amply-documented resistance gives them the right to self-esteem and national pride. However, those who value only power are not impressed, especially because Poles have failed to create a discourse in English that would counter so many mendacious or simply ignorant books and opinions circulating in America. Edward Said had a word for it: orientalism, or interpreting a people without including that people's input in the interpretation. We would like to state that while orientalism has somewhat retreated with regard to third world countries, it is alive and well concerning Poland. And we repeat, Poles have not done well in countering orientalism by having their own voices heard and available in languages other than Polish.
The years 1939-1989 cost two generations of Poles dearly. The country's infrastructure, education, health, and life itself suffered in ways that have not been articulated in American scholarship. Now, sixty years after the war ended, the descendants of some of the invaders cast a wistful glance eastward and point out that the invaders have suffered also! As Prime Minister Kaczyski states in the interview, since 1945 consecutive Warsaw governments tacitly consented to any interpretation of what happened in the twentieth century as long as such interpretations brought short-term gains for themselves. The net result is that Poles have been taken unaware by the recent rise in Germany of an unbelievable discourse--directed at Poland--that demands satisfaction for those Germans who lost their property in territories taken away after World War II. No one has heard of Germans suing the Russians in the Strasbourg court, only the Poles. Must Poland continue to pay for Hitler's war? (From The Chesterton Review, Spring/Summer 2007).
Note: The Sarmatian Review is a scholarly journal on the history, culture and society of Central and Eastern Europe, with strong attention to Poland. It is published, in English, in Texas. Information is available on the web.
Editorial Note: Recently, a Jewish group has demanded that Poland pay compensation for the property lost by Polish Jews during the Second World War. Apparently they are counting on the billions of dollars for equalization flowing to Poland from the European Community. This would be a most obscene demand.
Profesor Wolniewicz RM Prawda o Tusku 1/4
Profesor Wolniewicz RM Prawda o Tusku 2/4
Profesor Wolniewicz RM Prawda o Tusku 3/4
Profesor Wolniewicz RM Prawda o Tusku 4/4
Jerzy Robert Nowak Roszczenia zydowskie Trwam 24.02.200
ZBRODNIE KOMUNISTÓW- "Gen. August Emil Fieldorf 'Nil' " 1/2
ZBRODNIE KOMUNISTÓW- "Gen. August Emil Fieldorf 'Nil' " 2/2
Rabin kontra prof. Nowak
Encouraged by Rabbi Israel Singer's, the General Secretary of the World Jewish Congress, statements in 1996 such as " If Poland does not satisfy Jewish claims, it will be publicly attacked and humiliated in the international forum." So it is a plan to deliberately slander Poland's name and manipulate the American public's opinion against Poles. It was permitted to slander Poles now
Poland's geographical location has made it easy for aggressive peoples and countries to invade it and try to make of Poles a countryless nation. These invasions have cost Poland trillions of dollars in damage. Between 1939-1989 Poland was in the grip of two colonial powers: Nazi Germany in the Second World War, and the Soviet Union during and after the war. Poles are proud to have resisted both invasions, and this amply-documented resistance gives them the right to self-esteem and national pride. However, those who value only power are not impressed, especially because Poles have failed to create a discourse in English that would counter so many mendacious or simply ignorant books and opinions circulating in America. Edward Said had a word for it: orientalism, or interpreting a people without including that people's input in the interpretation. We would like to state that while orientalism has somewhat retreated with regard to third world countries, it is alive and well concerning Poland. And we repeat, Poles have not done well in countering orientalism by having their own voices heard and available in languages other than Polish.
The years 1939-1989 cost two generations of Poles dearly. The country's infrastructure, education, health, and life itself suffered in ways that have not been articulated in American scholarship. Now, sixty years after the war ended, the descendants of some of the invaders cast a wistful glance eastward and point out that the invaders have suffered also! As Prime Minister Kaczyski states in the interview, since 1945 consecutive Warsaw governments tacitly consented to any interpretation of what happened in the twentieth century as long as such interpretations brought short-term gains for themselves. The net result is that Poles have been taken unaware by the recent rise in Germany of an unbelievable discourse--directed at Poland--that demands satisfaction for those Germans who lost their property in territories taken away after World War II. No one has heard of Germans suing the Russians in the Strasbourg court, only the Poles. Must Poland continue to pay for Hitler's war? (From The Chesterton Review, Spring/Summer 2007).
Note: The Sarmatian Review is a scholarly journal on the history, culture and society of Central and Eastern Europe, with strong attention to Poland. It is published, in English, in Texas. Information is available on the web.
Editorial Note: Recently, a Jewish group has demanded that Poland pay compensation for the property lost by Polish Jews during the Second World War. Apparently they are counting on the billions of dollars for equalization flowing to Poland from the European Community. This would be a most obscene demand.
Profesor Wolniewicz RM Prawda o Tusku 1/4
Profesor Wolniewicz RM Prawda o Tusku 2/4
Profesor Wolniewicz RM Prawda o Tusku 3/4
Profesor Wolniewicz RM Prawda o Tusku 4/4
Jerzy Robert Nowak Roszczenia zydowskie Trwam 24.02.200
ZBRODNIE KOMUNISTÓW- "Gen. August Emil Fieldorf 'Nil' " 1/2
ZBRODNIE KOMUNISTÓW- "Gen. August Emil Fieldorf 'Nil' " 2/2
Tuesday, May 27, 2008
Marek Grechuta - Ojczyzna Poland our Country Zydzi i Israel powinni byc Polskimi Patryjotami a nie Targowica
Marek Grechuta - Ojczyzna Poland our Country Zydzi i Israel powinni byc Polskimi Patryjotami a nie Targowica
Historia swa
Historia swa
Polish Army 1939 Wizna Polish Thermopylae 40 to 1 Piosenka szwedzkiego zespołu Sabaton z najnowszego albumu The Art of War
Polish Army 1939 Wizna Polish Thermopylae 40 to 1 Piosenka szwedzkiego zespołu Sabaton z najnowszego albumu The Art of War
Polish Army 1939 Wizna Polish Thermopylae Piosenka szwedzkiego zespołu Sabaton z najnowszego albumu The Art of War
Eve of the Battle
Before the war the area of the village of Wizna was prepared as a fortified line of defence. It was to shield the Polish positions further to the south and guard the crossing of Narew and Biebrza rivers. The 9 kilometres long line of Polish defences was subordinate to the Polish Narew Corps shielding Łomża and providing defence of northern approach to Warsaw. The Wizna fortified area was one of the most important nodes in the area, providing cover of both the river crossings, and the roads Łomża-Białystok and roads towards Brześć Litewski on the rear of Polish forces.
The first construction works were started in April 1939. The spot was chosen carefully: most of the concrete bunkers were built on hills overlooking a swampy Narew River valley. They could be reached either through direct assault through the swamps or by attack along the causeway leading from the bridge in Wizna. Until September 1, 1939, 12 bunkers were built altogether. Six of them were heavy concrete bunkers with reinforced steel cupolas (8 tons of weight) while the other six were machine gun pillboxes. Additional four heavy bunkers were under construction at the moment the World War II started. In addition, the area was reinforced with trenches, anti-tank and anti-personnel obstacles, barbed wire lines and landmines. There were also plans of breaking the dams on the Biebrza and Narew rivers to flood the area, but the Summer of 1939 was one of the most dry seasons in Polish history and the level of water was too low.
Although not all bunkers were ready by the beginning of the war, the Polish lines of defences were well-prepared. The walls of an average bunker, 1.5 metres thick and reinforced with 20-centimetre-thick steel plates, could withstand a direct hit from even the heaviest guns available to the Wehrmacht at the time. The bunkers were situated on hills which gave good visibility of all the advancing forces.
[edit] First phase
On September 1, 1939, the Polish Defensive War of 1939 started. The German 3rd Army was to advance from East Prussia towards Warsaw, directly through the positions of Polish Narew Corps. On September 2 Captain Władysław Raginis was named the commander of the Wizna area. As his command post he chose the "GG-126" bunker near the village of Góra Strękowa. The bunker was located on a hill in the exact centre of the Polish lines. His forces numbered approximately 700 soldiers and NCOs and 20 officers armed with 6 pieces of artillery (76mm), 24 HMGs, 18 machine guns and two Kb ppanc wz.35 anti-tank carbines.
After initial clashes at the border, the Podlaska Cavalry Brigade operating in the area was forced to withdraw and on September 5 left the area. On September 3 Polish positions were spotted from the air and strafed with machine gun fire from enemy fighters. Later that day one of the German bombers returning from a bombing raid over Warsaw was shot down by machine gun fire.
On September 7, 1939, the reconnaissance units of the 10th Panzer Division of general Nicolaus von Falkenhorst captured the village of Wizna. Polish mounted reconnaissance squads abandoned the village after a short fight and retreated to the southern bank of Narew. When the German tanks tried to cross the bridge, it was blown up by Polish engineers. After dark, patrols of German infantry crossed the river and advanced towards Giełczyn, but were repelled with heavy casualties.
On September 8 general Heinz Guderian, commander of the XIX Panzer Corps, was ordered to advance through Wizna towards Brześć. By early morning of September 9 his units reached the Wizna area and were joined with 10th Panzer Division and "Lötzen" Brigade already present in the area. His forces numbered some 1 200 officers and 41 000 soldiers and NCOs, equipped with over 350 tanks, 108 howitzers, 58 pieces of artillery, 195 anti-tank guns, 108 mortars, 188 grenade launchers, 288 heavy machine guns and 689 machine guns. Altogether, his forces were some 40 times stronger than the Polish defenders.
Second Phase
In the early morning German planes dropped leaflets asking the Poles to give up and claiming that most of Poland is already in German hands and further resistance is futile. In order to strengthen the morale of his troops, Władysław Raginis swore that he will not leave his post alive and that the defence will continue. Soon after that an artillery barrage started. Polish artillery was several times weaker and soon was forced to retreat towards Białystok. After the preparations, the Germans attacked the northern flank of the Polish forces. Two platoons defending several bunkers located to the north of Narew were attacked from three sides by German tanks and infantry. Initially the losses among German infantry were high, but after heavy artillery fire commander of the Giełczyn area First Lieutenant Kiewlicz was ordered to burn the wooden bridge over Narew and withdraw to Białystok. The remnants of his forces broke through German encirclement and reached Białystok, where they joined the forces of general Franciszek Kleeberg.
At the same time an assault on the southern part of Polish fortifications came to a stalemate. Polish bunkers were lacking adequate anti-tank armament, but were able to rain the German infantry with machine gun fire. However, at 6 o'clock in the evening the infantry was forced to abandon the trenches and field fortifications and retreat into the bunkers. The German tanks could finally cross the Polish lines and advance towards Tykocin and Zambrów. However, the German infantry was still under heavy fire and was pinned down in the swampy fields in front of Polish bunkers.
Although Raginis was subordinate to Lt.Col. Tadeusz Tabaczyński, commander of the Osowiec fortified area located some 30 kilometres to the north, he could not expect any reinforcements. On September 8 Marshal of Poland Edward Śmigły-Rydz ordered the 135th Infantry Regiment that constituted the reserves of both Osowiec and Wizna, to be withdrawn to Warsaw. When the order was withdrawn and the unit returned to Osowiec, it was already too late to help the isolated Poles at Wizna.
Heavy fights for each of the—now isolated—bunkers continued. Several assaults were repelled during the night and in the early morning of September 10. At approximately 12 o'clock the German engineers with the help of tanks and artillery finally managed to destroy all but two Polish bunkers. Both of them were located in the centre of Góra Strękowa and continued the defence despite having much of the crew wounded or incapacitated and most of the machine guns destroyed. It is alleged that Heinz Guderian, in an attempt to end the Polish resistance, threatened the Polish commander that he would shoot the POWs if the remaining forces did not surrender. (No captives were shot.) Captain Władysław Raginis then ordered his men to abandon the bunker and committed suicide by throwing himself on a grenade.
After the Battle
After the Polish resistance ended, the XIX Panzer Corps advanced towards Zambrów and Wysokie Mazowieckie finally encircling and destroying the Polish Narew Corps. Later it advanced further southwards and took part in the Battle of Brześć.
Although all the bunkers were destroyed and the Polish resistance was finally broken, the fortified area of Wizna managed to halt the German advance for three days. The heroic struggle against overwhelming odds is nowadays one of the symbols of the Polish Defensive War of 1939 and is a part of Polish popular culture.
Polska moja ojczyzna
Polish Army 1939 Wizna Polish Thermopylae Piosenka szwedzkiego zespołu Sabaton z najnowszego albumu The Art of War
Eve of the Battle
Before the war the area of the village of Wizna was prepared as a fortified line of defence. It was to shield the Polish positions further to the south and guard the crossing of Narew and Biebrza rivers. The 9 kilometres long line of Polish defences was subordinate to the Polish Narew Corps shielding Łomża and providing defence of northern approach to Warsaw. The Wizna fortified area was one of the most important nodes in the area, providing cover of both the river crossings, and the roads Łomża-Białystok and roads towards Brześć Litewski on the rear of Polish forces.
The first construction works were started in April 1939. The spot was chosen carefully: most of the concrete bunkers were built on hills overlooking a swampy Narew River valley. They could be reached either through direct assault through the swamps or by attack along the causeway leading from the bridge in Wizna. Until September 1, 1939, 12 bunkers were built altogether. Six of them were heavy concrete bunkers with reinforced steel cupolas (8 tons of weight) while the other six were machine gun pillboxes. Additional four heavy bunkers were under construction at the moment the World War II started. In addition, the area was reinforced with trenches, anti-tank and anti-personnel obstacles, barbed wire lines and landmines. There were also plans of breaking the dams on the Biebrza and Narew rivers to flood the area, but the Summer of 1939 was one of the most dry seasons in Polish history and the level of water was too low.
Although not all bunkers were ready by the beginning of the war, the Polish lines of defences were well-prepared. The walls of an average bunker, 1.5 metres thick and reinforced with 20-centimetre-thick steel plates, could withstand a direct hit from even the heaviest guns available to the Wehrmacht at the time. The bunkers were situated on hills which gave good visibility of all the advancing forces.
[edit] First phase
On September 1, 1939, the Polish Defensive War of 1939 started. The German 3rd Army was to advance from East Prussia towards Warsaw, directly through the positions of Polish Narew Corps. On September 2 Captain Władysław Raginis was named the commander of the Wizna area. As his command post he chose the "GG-126" bunker near the village of Góra Strękowa. The bunker was located on a hill in the exact centre of the Polish lines. His forces numbered approximately 700 soldiers and NCOs and 20 officers armed with 6 pieces of artillery (76mm), 24 HMGs, 18 machine guns and two Kb ppanc wz.35 anti-tank carbines.
After initial clashes at the border, the Podlaska Cavalry Brigade operating in the area was forced to withdraw and on September 5 left the area. On September 3 Polish positions were spotted from the air and strafed with machine gun fire from enemy fighters. Later that day one of the German bombers returning from a bombing raid over Warsaw was shot down by machine gun fire.
On September 7, 1939, the reconnaissance units of the 10th Panzer Division of general Nicolaus von Falkenhorst captured the village of Wizna. Polish mounted reconnaissance squads abandoned the village after a short fight and retreated to the southern bank of Narew. When the German tanks tried to cross the bridge, it was blown up by Polish engineers. After dark, patrols of German infantry crossed the river and advanced towards Giełczyn, but were repelled with heavy casualties.
On September 8 general Heinz Guderian, commander of the XIX Panzer Corps, was ordered to advance through Wizna towards Brześć. By early morning of September 9 his units reached the Wizna area and were joined with 10th Panzer Division and "Lötzen" Brigade already present in the area. His forces numbered some 1 200 officers and 41 000 soldiers and NCOs, equipped with over 350 tanks, 108 howitzers, 58 pieces of artillery, 195 anti-tank guns, 108 mortars, 188 grenade launchers, 288 heavy machine guns and 689 machine guns. Altogether, his forces were some 40 times stronger than the Polish defenders.
Second Phase
In the early morning German planes dropped leaflets asking the Poles to give up and claiming that most of Poland is already in German hands and further resistance is futile. In order to strengthen the morale of his troops, Władysław Raginis swore that he will not leave his post alive and that the defence will continue. Soon after that an artillery barrage started. Polish artillery was several times weaker and soon was forced to retreat towards Białystok. After the preparations, the Germans attacked the northern flank of the Polish forces. Two platoons defending several bunkers located to the north of Narew were attacked from three sides by German tanks and infantry. Initially the losses among German infantry were high, but after heavy artillery fire commander of the Giełczyn area First Lieutenant Kiewlicz was ordered to burn the wooden bridge over Narew and withdraw to Białystok. The remnants of his forces broke through German encirclement and reached Białystok, where they joined the forces of general Franciszek Kleeberg.
At the same time an assault on the southern part of Polish fortifications came to a stalemate. Polish bunkers were lacking adequate anti-tank armament, but were able to rain the German infantry with machine gun fire. However, at 6 o'clock in the evening the infantry was forced to abandon the trenches and field fortifications and retreat into the bunkers. The German tanks could finally cross the Polish lines and advance towards Tykocin and Zambrów. However, the German infantry was still under heavy fire and was pinned down in the swampy fields in front of Polish bunkers.
Although Raginis was subordinate to Lt.Col. Tadeusz Tabaczyński, commander of the Osowiec fortified area located some 30 kilometres to the north, he could not expect any reinforcements. On September 8 Marshal of Poland Edward Śmigły-Rydz ordered the 135th Infantry Regiment that constituted the reserves of both Osowiec and Wizna, to be withdrawn to Warsaw. When the order was withdrawn and the unit returned to Osowiec, it was already too late to help the isolated Poles at Wizna.
Heavy fights for each of the—now isolated—bunkers continued. Several assaults were repelled during the night and in the early morning of September 10. At approximately 12 o'clock the German engineers with the help of tanks and artillery finally managed to destroy all but two Polish bunkers. Both of them were located in the centre of Góra Strękowa and continued the defence despite having much of the crew wounded or incapacitated and most of the machine guns destroyed. It is alleged that Heinz Guderian, in an attempt to end the Polish resistance, threatened the Polish commander that he would shoot the POWs if the remaining forces did not surrender. (No captives were shot.) Captain Władysław Raginis then ordered his men to abandon the bunker and committed suicide by throwing himself on a grenade.
After the Battle
After the Polish resistance ended, the XIX Panzer Corps advanced towards Zambrów and Wysokie Mazowieckie finally encircling and destroying the Polish Narew Corps. Later it advanced further southwards and took part in the Battle of Brześć.
Although all the bunkers were destroyed and the Polish resistance was finally broken, the fortified area of Wizna managed to halt the German advance for three days. The heroic struggle against overwhelming odds is nowadays one of the symbols of the Polish Defensive War of 1939 and is a part of Polish popular culture.
Polska moja ojczyzna
Monday, May 26, 2008
Republicans start swinging McCain. His fear mongering over Iran and his truly worrying
Republicans start swinging McCain. His fear mongering over Iran and his truly worrying
By ERIC MARGOLIS
Facebook Digg Del.icio.us Google Stumble Upon Furl Newsvine Reddit Technorati Blinklist Feed Me Yahoo Socializer Ma.gnolia Raw Sugar Simpy Squidoo Spurl Blink Bits Rojo Blogmarks Shadows Netvouz Scuttle Co.mments Bloglines Tailrank Sitejot + Help
The Republican attack machine went after Democratic presidential front-runner Barack Obama last week, and it was not a pretty sight.
After Obama sensibly proposed direct negotiations with Iran, Venezuela and Cuba, and described any potential danger from Iran as "tiny," Republican candidate John McCain accused him of being reckless and inexperienced.
"The threat the government of Iran poses is anything but tiny," thundered McCain -- the same "experienced" McCain who mistakenly claimed Iran was supporting Sunni fighters in Iraq.
President George W. Bush echoed McCain's accusations during a speech to Israel's Knesset last week, an oration so fulsome and simplistic, many worldly Israeli legislators were left looking embarrassed.
Bush insinuated Obama was a dangerous pre-Second World War type "appeaser" for daring suggest talking to Iran. Neocons blasted Obama as unpatriotic for not wearing an American flag pin and hinted he was a closet Muslim. Obama was so flummoxed by these violent attacks, he foolishly flip-flopped and agreed Iran was indeed a grave threat.
All this came as the danger of a U.S./Israeli attack on Iran to preserve Israel's Mideast nuclear monopoly was growing. Israel's PM Ehud Olmert called for a U.S. naval blockade of Iran, an open act of war.
GOERING
If the Second World War must be dredged up, a more appropriate reference would be Nazi Hermann Goering's famous formula for fascism: "All you have to do is to tell them (the people) they are being attacked and denounce the pacifists for lack of patriotism and exposing the country to danger. It works the same in any country."
McCain is an able, savvy domestic politician, but his absurd claims about Iran bring into question his understanding of foreign policy.
Iran has no long-range missiles, nuclear weapons or bombers. Its decrepit air force barely flies. Iran's so-called navy is a lightly armed coast guard.
Its ground forces are immobile and lack all forms of modern weapons. Tehran's defence budget is the size of Poland's or Norway's, and 100 times smaller than U.S. military spending.
It's the great Iraq scare all over. Republicans again are playing to the least-educated Americans by frightening them with fairy tales and outright lies. Iranian mad mullahs determined to shower A-bombs on Memphis and Dubuque have replaced Saddam and his Drones of Death. Should the U.S. talk to enemies? Of course. Diplomacy is one of three primary tools of statecraft along with military and economic power. Only arrant fools do not make use of it.
Just because the Bush administration largely relied on military power in foreign policy does not mean this Soviet-style approach need continue.
To whom does one negotiate if not with one's enemies and rivals? Besides, war is waged to attain diplomatic objectives, not win military victories. The greatest threat to world peace is not pipsqueaks such as Iran, Cuba or, even more laughably, Venezuela. It is the breakdown of normal diplomatic relations.
As Democrats rightly noted, the U.S. fruitfully negotiated with the Soviet Union and China when both powers threatened America with nuclear destruction.
The Bush administration has been making progress in nuclear talks with "pariah" North Korea.
SENSIBLE NATIONS
All sensible nations talk, either through normal or back door channels. Israel kept in touch with Iran after its revolution, secretly sold Tehran $5 billion of arms, and still maintains links today. Israel also has discreet links to Hamas and Hezbollah through third parties such as Egypt. Israel and old foe Syria just announced talks.
McCain should be reminded that hysteria is not a viable foreign policy, even if it is election silly season.
He is wrong to keep promoting the image of America as a spinster atop a chair, screaming in fear of a Muslim mouse called Iran. This is unworthy of the great United States.
If anyone is being reckless and inexperienced in foreign affairs, so far it's McCain. His fear mongering over Iran and his truly worrying
By ERIC MARGOLIS
Facebook Digg Del.icio.us Google Stumble Upon Furl Newsvine Reddit Technorati Blinklist Feed Me Yahoo Socializer Ma.gnolia Raw Sugar Simpy Squidoo Spurl Blink Bits Rojo Blogmarks Shadows Netvouz Scuttle Co.mments Bloglines Tailrank Sitejot + Help
The Republican attack machine went after Democratic presidential front-runner Barack Obama last week, and it was not a pretty sight.
After Obama sensibly proposed direct negotiations with Iran, Venezuela and Cuba, and described any potential danger from Iran as "tiny," Republican candidate John McCain accused him of being reckless and inexperienced.
"The threat the government of Iran poses is anything but tiny," thundered McCain -- the same "experienced" McCain who mistakenly claimed Iran was supporting Sunni fighters in Iraq.
President George W. Bush echoed McCain's accusations during a speech to Israel's Knesset last week, an oration so fulsome and simplistic, many worldly Israeli legislators were left looking embarrassed.
Bush insinuated Obama was a dangerous pre-Second World War type "appeaser" for daring suggest talking to Iran. Neocons blasted Obama as unpatriotic for not wearing an American flag pin and hinted he was a closet Muslim. Obama was so flummoxed by these violent attacks, he foolishly flip-flopped and agreed Iran was indeed a grave threat.
All this came as the danger of a U.S./Israeli attack on Iran to preserve Israel's Mideast nuclear monopoly was growing. Israel's PM Ehud Olmert called for a U.S. naval blockade of Iran, an open act of war.
GOERING
If the Second World War must be dredged up, a more appropriate reference would be Nazi Hermann Goering's famous formula for fascism: "All you have to do is to tell them (the people) they are being attacked and denounce the pacifists for lack of patriotism and exposing the country to danger. It works the same in any country."
McCain is an able, savvy domestic politician, but his absurd claims about Iran bring into question his understanding of foreign policy.
Iran has no long-range missiles, nuclear weapons or bombers. Its decrepit air force barely flies. Iran's so-called navy is a lightly armed coast guard.
Its ground forces are immobile and lack all forms of modern weapons. Tehran's defence budget is the size of Poland's or Norway's, and 100 times smaller than U.S. military spending.
It's the great Iraq scare all over. Republicans again are playing to the least-educated Americans by frightening them with fairy tales and outright lies. Iranian mad mullahs determined to shower A-bombs on Memphis and Dubuque have replaced Saddam and his Drones of Death. Should the U.S. talk to enemies? Of course. Diplomacy is one of three primary tools of statecraft along with military and economic power. Only arrant fools do not make use of it.
Just because the Bush administration largely relied on military power in foreign policy does not mean this Soviet-style approach need continue.
To whom does one negotiate if not with one's enemies and rivals? Besides, war is waged to attain diplomatic objectives, not win military victories. The greatest threat to world peace is not pipsqueaks such as Iran, Cuba or, even more laughably, Venezuela. It is the breakdown of normal diplomatic relations.
As Democrats rightly noted, the U.S. fruitfully negotiated with the Soviet Union and China when both powers threatened America with nuclear destruction.
The Bush administration has been making progress in nuclear talks with "pariah" North Korea.
SENSIBLE NATIONS
All sensible nations talk, either through normal or back door channels. Israel kept in touch with Iran after its revolution, secretly sold Tehran $5 billion of arms, and still maintains links today. Israel also has discreet links to Hamas and Hezbollah through third parties such as Egypt. Israel and old foe Syria just announced talks.
McCain should be reminded that hysteria is not a viable foreign policy, even if it is election silly season.
He is wrong to keep promoting the image of America as a spinster atop a chair, screaming in fear of a Muslim mouse called Iran. This is unworthy of the great United States.
If anyone is being reckless and inexperienced in foreign affairs, so far it's McCain. His fear mongering over Iran and his truly worrying
Sunday, May 25, 2008
Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, former national security advisor's addresses the topic of transatlantic relations.
Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, former national security advisor's addresses the topic of transatlantic relations.
This is the transcript from the former national security advisor's keynote speech.
This is the transcript from the former national security advisor's keynote speech.
Since 1971, BUMAR has been in international defence equipment, construction machinery, mining machines and materials handling
Since 1971, BUMAR has been in international defence equipment, construction machinery, mining machines and materials handling
Polish Mi 24 Hind Assault Helicopter
Since 1971, BUMAR has been in international defence equipment, construction machinery, mining machines and materials handling / transport equipment business.
Our long-time experience, trade name known throughout the world, achievements in introduction of advanced new technologies to the Polish industry and in initiating co-operation with renowned world manufacturers, efficient and professional staff are our major advantages.
BUMAR Sp. z o.o. is the dominant entity in BUMAR Group, which includes 19 manufacturing and trading companies of the Polish defense industry, sector specialized in ammunition, rockets and armour, and of the construction machinery, agricultural machinery and construction services.
The capital of the BUMAR Group, accumulated in BUMAR Sp. z o.o. amounted, as at October 2006, to PLN 800 412 500,00.
The leading role of BUMAR in the BUMAR Group is evidenced by central procurement of materials and bought-out items, by creating and financing the production for domestic and foreign markets, production monitoring of production capacities, introduction of changes in production profile and volume, co-ordination and performance of research and development work, and performance of off-set agreements.
Irrespective of the above tasks in BUMAR Group, our firm leads supplies to foreign and domestic markets, if civilian products: construction machines, road making machinery, railway accessories and other manufacturing industry products.
On this web page, detailed information on goods and services, offered by us and on the current structure of the BUMAR group, can be found.
1. ARMAMENT ARMOUR
2. AIR DEFENCE SYSTEMS
3. OPTOELECTRONIC & MEASURING DEVICES
4. ARMAMENT AND PERSONAL EQUIPMENT
5. AMMUNITION
6. OVERHAUL
Polish Mi 24 Hind Assault Helicopter
Since 1971, BUMAR has been in international defence equipment, construction machinery, mining machines and materials handling / transport equipment business.
Our long-time experience, trade name known throughout the world, achievements in introduction of advanced new technologies to the Polish industry and in initiating co-operation with renowned world manufacturers, efficient and professional staff are our major advantages.
BUMAR Sp. z o.o. is the dominant entity in BUMAR Group, which includes 19 manufacturing and trading companies of the Polish defense industry, sector specialized in ammunition, rockets and armour, and of the construction machinery, agricultural machinery and construction services.
The capital of the BUMAR Group, accumulated in BUMAR Sp. z o.o. amounted, as at October 2006, to PLN 800 412 500,00.
The leading role of BUMAR in the BUMAR Group is evidenced by central procurement of materials and bought-out items, by creating and financing the production for domestic and foreign markets, production monitoring of production capacities, introduction of changes in production profile and volume, co-ordination and performance of research and development work, and performance of off-set agreements.
Irrespective of the above tasks in BUMAR Group, our firm leads supplies to foreign and domestic markets, if civilian products: construction machines, road making machinery, railway accessories and other manufacturing industry products.
On this web page, detailed information on goods and services, offered by us and on the current structure of the BUMAR group, can be found.
1. ARMAMENT ARMOUR
2. AIR DEFENCE SYSTEMS
3. OPTOELECTRONIC & MEASURING DEVICES
4. ARMAMENT AND PERSONAL EQUIPMENT
5. AMMUNITION
6. OVERHAUL
Polish companies interested in having trade with Iranian partner:
Polish companies interested in having trade with Iranian partner:
Name of the company
Dramiński
Contact person
Mr. Bogusław Chodorowski
Contact data
boguslaw.chodorowski@draminski.com
The company is interested in doing business with Iranian producers of animal drugs
Name of the company
Kanlux S.A.
Contact person
Mr. Andrzej Skotowski
Contact data
http://www.kanlux.pl/
Tel.: +48 /32/ 388 74 00 Fax: +48 /32/ 388 74 99 E-mail: kanlux@kanlux.pl
The company is interested in exporting the lighting equipment
Name of the company
Jeremy sp. z o.o.
Contact person
Mr. Jeremi Mroczkowski
Contact data
ul. Odlewnicza 5, 03-231 Warszawa, Poland
tel. 0048 22 614 53 75
fax. 0048 22 811 06 03
http://www.jeremy.pl/
jeremy@jeremy.pl
The company is interested in doing business with Iranian producers of baking machines
Name of the company
PRONAR sp. z o.o.
Contact person
Mrs. Magdalena Pieńkowska
Contact data
malgorzata.pienkowska@pronar.pl
The company is interested in doing business with Iranian producers of paraffin
Name of the company
Altrex International Ltd.
Contact person
Mr. Jan Szandar
Contact data
magda.popek@altrex.com.pl
casing@altrex.com.pl
The company is interested in doing business with partners from metallurgy and oil branch
Name of the company
ADMIT
Contact person
Mr. Wacław Bylok
Contact data
http://www.admit.pl/
tel.: +48 33 8519000,-3,-4 -5fax: +48 33 8519001,-2e-mail: biuro@admit.pl
The company is interested in importing the paraffin
Name of the company
Agencja SOMA sp. j.
Contact person
Mr. Marek Orłowski
Contact data
ul. Bronikowskiego 1, 02-796 Warszawa, Poland
tel. 0048 22 649 76 69
fax. 0048 22 649 76 83
http://www.soma.info.pl/
http://www.elektroinstalacje.pl/
http://www.lightfair.pl/
e-mail: office@elektroinstalacje.pl
e-mail: soma@lightfair.pl
The company is interested in the promotion of Polish lighting equipment and electric installations. The Embassy can provide the catalogue of the company's offer.
Name of the company
Dramiński
Contact person
Mr. Bogusław Chodorowski
Contact data
boguslaw.chodorowski@draminski.com
The company is interested in doing business with Iranian producers of animal drugs
Name of the company
Kanlux S.A.
Contact person
Mr. Andrzej Skotowski
Contact data
http://www.kanlux.pl/
Tel.: +48 /32/ 388 74 00 Fax: +48 /32/ 388 74 99 E-mail: kanlux@kanlux.pl
The company is interested in exporting the lighting equipment
Name of the company
Jeremy sp. z o.o.
Contact person
Mr. Jeremi Mroczkowski
Contact data
ul. Odlewnicza 5, 03-231 Warszawa, Poland
tel. 0048 22 614 53 75
fax. 0048 22 811 06 03
http://www.jeremy.pl/
jeremy@jeremy.pl
The company is interested in doing business with Iranian producers of baking machines
Name of the company
PRONAR sp. z o.o.
Contact person
Mrs. Magdalena Pieńkowska
Contact data
malgorzata.pienkowska@pronar.pl
The company is interested in doing business with Iranian producers of paraffin
Name of the company
Altrex International Ltd.
Contact person
Mr. Jan Szandar
Contact data
magda.popek@altrex.com.pl
casing@altrex.com.pl
The company is interested in doing business with partners from metallurgy and oil branch
Name of the company
ADMIT
Contact person
Mr. Wacław Bylok
Contact data
http://www.admit.pl/
tel.: +48 33 8519000,-3,-4 -5fax: +48 33 8519001,-2e-mail: biuro@admit.pl
The company is interested in importing the paraffin
Name of the company
Agencja SOMA sp. j.
Contact person
Mr. Marek Orłowski
Contact data
ul. Bronikowskiego 1, 02-796 Warszawa, Poland
tel. 0048 22 649 76 69
fax. 0048 22 649 76 83
http://www.soma.info.pl/
http://www.elektroinstalacje.pl/
http://www.lightfair.pl/
e-mail: office@elektroinstalacje.pl
e-mail: soma@lightfair.pl
The company is interested in the promotion of Polish lighting equipment and electric installations. The Embassy can provide the catalogue of the company's offer.
Polish contribution to the Allied victory in World War 2 (1939-1945)
Polish contribution to the Allied victory in World War 2 (1939-1945)
Poland was the only country to fight in the European theatre of war from the first to the last day of the greatest armed conflict in the history of mankind. The war began with invading Poland: first, on September 1st, 1939, by the Nazi Germany, soon after, on September 17th, by the Soviet Union. Both invaders acted in concert, upon the Ribbentrop - Molotov Treaty (concluded on August 23rd). The allies of Poland - Great Britain and France - declared war upon Germany on September 3rd, but did not undertake any efficient military actions (the so-called "Phony War"). The Soviet Union joined the anti-Nazi alliance only in the summer of 1941, when invaded by Germany. The United States, although they gave a lot of significant material aid, joined the military actions within the frames of the coalition in December 1941 when assaulted by Japan and when Germany declared war upon them.
In the Polish contribution to the defeat of Germany in the first place we notice determination and perseverance: despite the severe defeat in 1939, the Poles formed armies five more times, including four outside of their country: in France in 1939, in the United Kingdom in the summer of 1940 (after the defeat and capitulation of France), in the USSR in 1941 (the army of Gen. Anders that fought later in the South of Europe), and then again in the Soviet Union in 1943 there emerged the one that later fought at the Red Army's side. The fifth Polish army, created at the end of September of 1939 was the conspiratorial armed force in the occupied territory. For the entire period of the war there also existed the very important "silent front" - the intelligence. Probably up to 2 millions Poles served since September 1st, 1939 to May 8th, 1945 in all the Polish military formations - regular armies, partisan troops and underground forces. In the final stage of war the Polish troops on all the European fronts amounted to some 600 thousands soldiers (infantry, armored troops, aircraft and navy), and in the summer of 1944 while entering the open fight with the retreating Germans, the armed underground numbered more than 300 thousands sworn soldiers. It can be concluded that Poland put in the field the fourth greatest Allied army.
Basic bibliography:
Józef Garliński, Poland in the Second World War, 1939-1945, London 1985
ed. Edward Pawłowski, Wojsko Polskie w II Wojnie Światowej, Warszawa 1995.
The 1939 Campaign
At the outbreak of the war, Polish army was able to put in the field almost one million soldiers, 2800 guns, 500 tanks and 400 aircraft. On the September 1st, the German forces set to war against Poland amounted to more than 1.5 million solders, 9000 guns, 2500 tanks and almost 2000 aircraft. The Red Army began the invasion sending in the first lot more than 620 000 soldiers, 4700 tanks and 3200 aircraft. Despite the overwhelming odds and the necessity of defense against the offensive in all directions, the Polish army fought for 35 days. Warsaw held until September 28th, the Polish garrison of Hel Peninsula for more than a month. The last battle against German troops took place on October 5th.
Polish losses in combat against Germans (killed and missing in action) amounted to ca. 70 000. 420 000 were taken prisoners. Losses against the Red Army added up to 6000 to 7000 of casualties and MIA, 250 000 were taken prisoners. Of these, almost all of the officers were murdered in the spring on 1940 in Katyn, Kharkiv and Tver upon Stalin's decision. Although the Polish army - considering the inactivity of the Allies - was in an unfavorable position - it managed to inflict serious losses to the enemies: 14 000 German soldiers were killed or MIA, 674 tanks and 319 armored vehicles destroyed or badly damaged, 230 aircraft shot down; the Red Army lost (killed and MIA) about 2500 soldiers, 150 combat vehicles and 20 aircraft. For many weeks Poland contained significant German forces, no advantage of this was taken by the Allies. Besides that, the necessity to reinforce the destroyed in Poland German military forces gave France and Great Britain more time to prepare to repulse invasion.
Basic bibliography:
Paweł Wieczorkiewicz, Kampania 1939 roku, Warszawa 2001;
Steven J. Zaloga, Poland 1939. The Birth of Blitzkrieg, London 2002;
Alexander B. Rossion, Hitler Strikes Poland. Blitzkrieg, Ideology, and Atrocity, Kansas 2003.
The underground army home
Home Army
In the night from September 26th to 27th, 1939, a day before Warsaw's capitulation, General Michał Karaszewicz-Tokarzewski received from the Commander-in-Chief of the Polish army (at the time interned in Romania) an order to create a military conspiracy. Over a few weeks he summoned up a group of officers who avoided captivity and from the scratch they built the most powerful underground army in the occupied Europe. The first name of it was Służba Zwycięstwu Polski (SZP - Polish Victory Service), later Związek Walki Zbrojnej (ZWZ - Union for Armed Struggle), and from February 1942 - Armia Krajowa (AK - Home Army). This resistance is widely known under this last name. The actual creator of the Home Army was Gen. Stefan Rowecki (also known as "Grot") who was the chief of staff first, and from June 1940 to June 1943 - the Commanding Officer. After his seizure by Gestapo, this post was taken by Gen. Tadeusz Komorowski (aka Bór). The Home Army, being a voluntary force, in the same time was both a part of Polskie Siły Zbrojne (PSZ - or PAF - Polish Armed Forces) whose high command was located in exile, and the most important element of the Polish Underground State. The main goal of the AK was preparation and conducting the national uprising in case of advancing frontlines or general collapse of the German armed forces. There were created suitable structures - staff, high commands of arms and services, territorial commands (regions, and on lower level - districts), weapons were collected, officers and soldiers trained, information about enemy gathered. However, because of the atrocious nature of the German occupation, public feelings and attitude, it was necessary to undertake daily struggle. Therefore the AK activities consisted of two strictly connected to each other parts: 1. the daily conspiratorial struggle, 2. the national uprising (during which the Home Army was supposed to recreate the full structure of armed forces).
Parallel to the official army there emerged military units of political parties, conspiracies based upon social organizations (e.g. upon the Fire Brigades emerged Skała, or "the Rock") and youth associations (e.g. Szare Szeregi, or "the Grey Ranks", based upon the Związek Harcerstwa Polskiego, or the "Polish Scouting Association"). They emerged thanks to the sabotage groups prepared by the General Staff before the war's outbreak. One of the tasks of the AK Commanding Officer was uniting them into one force. This took quite a lot of time. Eventually, only a part of radical nationalists (NSZ - Narodowe Siły Zbrojne - National Armed Forces) and, emerging up from the summer 1942 - military units of communist party remained out of the AK structures. In the spring of 1944, when the process of unification was ended, the Home Army numbered more than 300 thousand sworn soldiers.
Apart from the staff and territorial structures there existed special units dealing among others with subversion and sabotage. In April 1940 the Związek Odwetu emerged (ZO - Retaliation Union), later transformed into the Kierownictwo Dywersji (Kedyw - Subversion Command) which acted on central level and in each region. In September 1941, because of the change in the Polish-Soviet relations the organization "Wachlarz" (or the "Fan") was created. It dealt with intelligence and sabotage closely behind the German-Soviet frontlines. From January 1st 1941 to June 30th, 1944 within the frames of daily struggle the AK and subordinate units ditched among others 732 trains, set fire to 443 transports, destroyed about 4300 vehicles, burnt 130 magazines of weapons and equipments, damaged 19 000 train carriages and 6900 engines, set fire to 1200 gasoline tanks, blew up 40 railway bridges, destroyed 5 oil shafts, froze 3 blast-furnaces, conducted about 25 sabotage acts in war factories, 5700 attempts on officers of different police formations, soldiers and volksdeutschs (Polish citizens of German origin that volunteered to quisle with Germans), set free prisoners of 16 prisons. The partisan troops - active from 1943 - fought more than 170 combats, killing more than 1000 Germans. At the beginning of 1944 there were about 60 active AK partisan troops (some numbered up to a few hundred soldiers) and about 200 sabotage squads. The AK organized a few conspiratorial groups in some of the concentration camp (e.g. in Auschwitz) and among Poles sent to Germany for slave work. The runaway allied prisoners of war were also helped. A contact by radio and couriers with the Polish government in exile and the Commander-in-Chief staff was also maintained. There functioned permanent transfer bases (the most important one in Budapest) and courier routes (e.g. to Sweden). Since February 1942 began to arrive the trained in England Polish sabotage and intelligence officers (the so called "cichociemni" - literally the "silent and dark ones"). In total 316 of them were parachuted in Poland. There also was a subversion propaganda action going on, addressed to German soldiers (the so called Action "N"). The AK conducted some large publishing activities: there were about 250 newspapers edited, including the largest resistance title - "Biuletyn Informacyjny" (Information Bulletin), which was published from November 5th, 1939 up to January, 1945. Besides the "Biuletyn" there were also issued military books of rules, handbooks and manuals for the cadets of the underground military schools (some 8600 soldiers graduated from them). As it can be seen, there were many various activities going on. Their own contribution to fight against the occupation regime paid Żydowska Organizacja Bojowa (ŻOB - Jewish Fighting Organization) and the supported directly by the AK Żydowski Związek Wojskowy (ŻZW - Jewish Military Union) - mainly in the form of the heroic and desperate Warsaw Ghetto Uprising (April 19th - May 16th 1943).
To the most spectacular actions of the Home Army belong: paralyzing the railway junction in Warsaw (night from October 7th to 8th , 1942), recapturing the prisoners in Pińsk (January 18th, 1943), bomb assault in a city railway station in Berlin (February 15th, 1943), recapturing the prisoners in downtown Warsaw (the so-called Arsenal action, March 26th, 1943), assassination of Franz Kutschera, the SS and Police Commander for the District of Warsaw (February 1st, 1994).
It is estimated that until July, 1944 about 34 thousand soldiers of the Home Army and subordinate units were killed- some in combat but mostly they were executed or tortured to death in prisons - more or less 10% of the ranks. Among the "cichociemni" the losses added up to 1/3 of the ranks.
The Underground State
It was possible to build up the conspiratorial army to such a great size and manage for it to be so active only because it was closely connected with the Polskie Państwo Podziemne (PPP - the Polish Underground State) and civil resistance. The PPP was a unique phenomenon: in none of the European states there existed such a vast and differentiated structure. Besides the AK the main component of the PPP was Delegatura Rządu na Kraj (Government Delegate's Office at Home) which created a network of underground administration of all levels. The Kierownictwo Walki Cywilnej (Civil Fighting Executive) coordinated the activities of the so-called "little sabotage", undertook propaganda actions and activities aiming at maintaining the morale and spirit of resistance against Germany. A daily set of news was prepared for the Polish radio "Świt" (or the"Dawn") which broadcast from England but pretended to exist in Poland. The Kierownictwo also conducted secret education (including university level), helped the families of the victims of the invader and ran a separate action aiding the Jews ("Żegota"). It had its sections in prisons, by the post offices employees blocked the denunciations sent to German authorities, prepared plans for the after-war period and projects of running the territories that were expected to be captured on Germany (Biuro Ziem Nowych - the New Lands Office).
There existed secret courts (civil and military ones), which sentenced the traitors and punished Nazi collaborators with infamy. Another part of the PPP was the existing from 1940 representation of political parties which eventually was named Rada Jedności Narodowej (RJN, the Council for National Unity) and was a substitute of the parliament. The RJN published proclamations and program declarations (e.g. about the goals of war and future political system of the country). Besides the PPP there functioned hundreds of social, political and cultural associations, there were published more than two thousand books and brochures and more than 1.8 thousand different periodicals. Within the resistance but outside of the PPP were situated only extreme organizations: the NSZ on the right side and the communists on the left. Both these formations tried to create their own substitute of quasi-state structures.
"Burza" (the "Tempest")
The plans of national uprising, which was the main goal of the AK, were changed a few times. The first one emerged when there still existed the Soviet-German alliance, the second one when the Soviet Union joined the anti-Nazi coalition. The last one was elaborated in the autumn of 1943 after breaking off by Moscow the diplomatic relations with Poland and when it turned out for sure that the Polish territory would be first entered by the Red Army. In this plan the uprising received the codename "Burza" (the "Tempest"). It assumed that the very moment when the frontlines would advance close to Poland, all the troops and structures of the AK would be called up to arms under the names of the pre-war Polish Army units (divisions and regiments), and increase sabotage actions. But first of all, they would begin to fight openly the retreating German troops, trying to get in touch at tactical level with the Red Army. In captured cities the underground authorities would come to light (the region and district delegate offices), take over the power and welcome as hosts the entering Soviet troops. Thus the uprising was to be a successive action and not just a one-time appearance in the entire country.
"Burza" began on January 15th, 1944 with mobilization in Volhynia (the so-called "Polskie Kresy Wschodnie" - the Polish Eastern Borderlands) where local troops - transform into the 27th Volhynian Infantry Division of the AK - began actions against the Germans. However, when during the fights the AK units had to cross the frontlines, they were disarmed by NKVD (the Peoples Commissariat for Internal Affairs - Soviet secret political police). Despite the negative turnout, the AK High Command decided to continue the "Burza". More and more mobilized units entered the combat, and the greatest concentration of troops fought together with the Red Army in the battle of Vilnius (July 6th and 7th, 1944). A few days later the NKVD troops surrounded the Poles, disarmed them and interned. A part of them were able to manoeuvre out of encirclement. Again, the AK continued the insurgent action and its troops participated in capturing the subsequent cities and town: together with the Red Army in case of the big cities (like Lviv or Vilnius), or often on their own, in case of attacking some smaller German garrisons. For instance, in the region of Lublin, the AK units captured 7 cities on their own and 11 more together with the Soviets. The "Burza" covered a large territory from the Carpathians to Vilnius and the Lower Bug River, some 120 thousand soldiers fighting. On July 30th, 1944, Stalin ordered to disarm the AK, and the representatives of the Underground State that came out of the hiding and took over the offices were arrested. At least 20 to 30 thousand people were deported to penal colonies in the interior of the Soviet Union, most of them have never returned.
The Warsaw Uprising
Because of the experiences from the East and fears that fights in Warsaw would cause the destruction of the city and losses among the civil population, the opinions whether the "Burza" should take place varied. Eventually, it was decided that the battle of Warsaw would have not only the military significance but also political one. The emotional tension among the citizens and a hearty will to fight expressed by the AK soldiers were also taken into consideration. Finally the decision about starting the uprising in Warsaw was made (with participation of the Government Delegate Home and the head of RJN) on July 31st, when the advancing Red Army units were coming close to the lying on the eastern bank of the Vistula River city district of Praga. Some 23 000 of the AK soldiers started the uprising in the afternoon of August 1st, 1944, under the Warsaw Region Commanding Officer, colonel Antoni Chruściel (aka "Monter"). Although during the first few days of combat the insurgents captured a lot of strategic objects, and as the days went by the ranks were increasing (together there fought some 34 thousands of soldiers), the Home Army was unable to fully drive the Germans out of the downtown, nor to seize the main communication routes and bridges. The 16-thousand-strong German garrison was significantly reinforced (including the troops specializing in fighting partisans) and on August 5th, 1944, the Germans began to counter-strike, using tanks, heavy artillery and assault aircraft. In the first of recaptured districts (Wola), the German troops committed a mass slaughter of civilians. This was to happen again later a few times. The attacking German columns split Warsaw into the "insurgent islands", the contact between which was managed by secret passages through cellars and sewers. In these areas the authority was taken over by Polish administration, newspapers were published, a radio station broadcast ("Błyskawica", or the "Lightning"), municipal services worked.
It was expected that the battle would last a few more days, until the Red Army entered the city. Despite many pleas, including the ones from the Polish prime-minister who was paying a visit in Moscow since July 31st, sometime before August 8th, Stalin ordered to delay offensive actions nearby Warsaw. He did not even agree for the allied transport airplanes to land on Soviet airfields which practically precluded helping the uprising by airdropping the supplies, because the nearest airfields were located in England and Italy. Not till the middle of September, when the uprising was already on the verge of disaster, a mass air-drop was possible but the insurgents took over only some 47 tons of it. The battle dragged on, the death toll among the civilians increased, there lacked food, water and medicines. Capturing Praga by the Red Army and unsuccessful attempts of the Polish troops commanded by General Berling to establish a bridge-head in the left-bank Warsaw did not change the situation. On October 2nd, 1944, the insurgents capitulated. Some 150 000 civilians were killed, most of the city was utterly ruined (later on special German squads kept destroying the remaining buildings), 520 000 citizens expelled of the city. 17 000 insurgents were taken prisoners.
The Warsaw Uprising was the greatest battle fought by the Polish army in WW2: 10 000 soldiers were killed, 7 000 more were missing in action. Major losses were inflicted to Germans - 10 000 killed, 6 000 MIA, 300 tanks, guns and armored vehicles lost.
The uprising did not reach its military nor political objectives, yet for the generations of Poles to come it became a symbol of courage and determination in the struggle for independence.
Basic bibliography:
Norman Davies, Rising '44. "The Battle for Warsaw", London 2004;
Stefan Korboński, The Polish Underground State: A Guide to the Underground 1939-1945, Boulder 1979;
Marek Ney-Krwawicz, The Polish Home Army, 1939-1945, London 2001.
Polish Armed Forces in the West
The campaign in Poland had not finished yet when Polish troops abroad started to form. The government of Poland in exile that emerged in Paris adopted as its main goal the fight at the side of the Allies and creating a Polish army in France. This was the beginning of the Polskie Siły Zbrojne (PSZ - Polish Armed Forces) in the West which fought until May 1945 in three war theatres: Western Europe (1940 and 1944-1945), North Europe (1940) and Mediterranean (North Africa in 1940-1942, Italy 1944-1945). The first Commander-in-Chief was General Władysław Sikorski, who also was the Prime Minister of the government in exile. After his death (July 1943), his post was assigned to General Kazimierz Sosnkowski, dismissed in September 1944. After him General Tadeusz Komorowski, the AK Commanding Officer was appointed who after the Warsaw Uprising defeat became a German prisoner of war.
Campaign in France
Polish troops emerged of a stream of soldiers and officers that reached France through Romania, Hungary, Lithuania and Latvia. 43 000 evacuated, the rest of them ran away on their own. Also the Polish immigrants living in France applied to the army. In a few months the Polish Army reached the number of 84 000 soldiers in four infantry divisions and two brigades. There were also formed four air squadrons and units of anti-aircraft artillery that amounted to about 7 000 people. Besides, a part of withdrawing troops found their way to Syria (administrated by the French) where Samodzielna Brygada Strzelców Karpackich emerged (Independent Carpathian Riflemen Brigade).
During the German Blitzkrieg in France in May 1940 the Allied defense broke already after two weeks which was the reason for a hasty withdrawal of the British troops and capitulation of France. Polish units fought in the southern section of the front: the Polish Grenadier Division after one week of fighting was dissolved because of the French-German armistice talks; the soldiers of the Brygada Kawalerii Pancerno-Motorowej (Armoured Cavalry Brigade) after the battles of Champaubert and Montbard upon the order of their commander, General Maczek, destroyed their equipment and withdrew south; 2 Dywizja Strzelców (2nd Riflemen Division) stopped the German attack on the Clos-du-Doubs hills but when on June 19th it turned out that the fight is almost over, it crossed the Swiss border and was interned there. The Samodzielna Brygada Strzelców Podhalańskich (Indipendent Podhalan Riflemen Brigade) was included in Allied forces sent to Norway in May 1940 and participated in the battle of Narvik. Altogether, about 50 000 Polish soldiers fought defending France, 1400 were killed, more than 4500 were wounded. Polish fighter pilots achieved 50 confirmed and 5 probable kills of enemy aircraft. The defeat of France meant the defeat of the Polish troops fighting at the side of the French. Only about 20 000 men were able to withdraw to England. The great organizational effort made since the autumn 1939 was wasted.
Battle of Britain and the Polish Air Force
The Polish pilots stood out during the campaign of 1939 and highlighted during the campaign in France. But the most distinguished role they played in 1940 when the decisive for the fate of the England and the coalition Battle of Britain took place (August 8th - October 31st, 1940). The British industry produced enough aircraft but it was not possible to train enough pilots in such a short time. Therefore the role of foreign airmen, of whom the greatest group formed the 151 Polish pilots, cannot be overemphasized. They fought both in the British and Polish squadrons (302nd and 303rd fighter and 300th and 301st bomber squadrons). During the Battle of Britain the Poles shot down 203 Luftwaffe aircraft which stood for 12% of total German losses in this battle. The success of the Polish pilots inclined the British command to expand the Polish Air Force: until summer 1941 8 fighter and 4 bomber squadrons emerged. Later on new ones were created, including the Polish Fighting Team (commonly called the "Skalski's circus", named derived from its commander's surname) that fought in North Africa. Polish pilots protected England, e.g. by destroying 193 German V1 and V2 missiles, and participated in many operations over the continent, escorting the bombers, bombing different targets (e.g. Ruhr, Hamburg, Brema), provided air support to the landing troops during the invasion in June 1944. In 1944 the Polish air unit operating from Italy airdropped in Poland men and equipment for the AK, and during the Warsaw Uprising the Polish crews flew 91 times with the supplies for the fighting insurgents. From 1940 to 1945 the Polish squadrons and the Polish pilots serving in British units achieved 621 confirmed kills, and together with campaigns of 1939 and France- 900 confirmed and 189 probable.
Basic bibliography:
Lenne Olson, Stanley Cloud, A Question of Honour. The Kosciuszko squadron: forgotten heroes of World War II, New York, 2003;
Adam Zamoyski, The Forgotten Few: The Polish Air Force in the Second World War, New York 1996.
The Battle of Atlantic and the Polish navy
Just before war's outbreak three Polish destroyers (Błyskawica, Burza and Grom) left for Great Britain. Later on they were joined by the submarines Orzeł and Wilk that managed to escape the Germans. The Polish Navy since 1940 was constantly expanded by the ships leased from the Royal Navy and in 1945 it amounted to 4 thousand seamen on 15 ships (1 cruiser, 6 destroyers, 3 submarines and 5 torpedo boats). During the war there served 26 ships (2 cruisers, 9 destroyers, 5 submarines and 11 torpedo boats). At the side of the British and American fleets, the Polish vessels participated in tens of operations: e.g. in May 1940 in Narvik, during the evacuation from Dunkirk, in 1944 during the landing in Normandy (operation "Overlord"), escorting convoys to Murmansk and Malta but most of all in the Battle of the Atlantic which took place from 1940 to 1944, including the famous "hunt for Bismarck", the greatest Kriegsmarine battleship (May 1941). Totally, they participated in 665 battles and escorted 787 convoys, sunk 12 enemy ships (including 5 submarines) and 41 merchant vessels, damaged 24 more (including 8 submarines). Besides that the Allied sea transport was reinforced with 36 Polish merchant vessels which 1939 were abroad, total displacement of 117 thousand tons.
Basic bibliography:
Michael A. Peszke, Poland's Navy 1918-1945, New York 1999;
Jerzy Pertek, Mała flota wielka duchem, Poznań 1989.
Land battles 1941-1945
After the defeat of France, the Carpathian Riflemen Brigade left Syria and joined the British forces in Egypt. It was an excellent unit of 5 000 men, mainly experienced soldiers, the 1939 veterans and volunteers. In August 1941 it moved to Libya where it won fame in the heavy fights during the defense of the besieged Tobruk, and in the spring of 1942 in the Libyan Desert.
About 20 00 men managed to withdraw from France to Great Britain. They formed 1st Polish Corps that was supposed to defend the eastern coast of Scotland, and 1st Independent Parachute Brigade that was supposed to be airdropped in Poland once the national uprising began. In 1941 1st Armored Division was created within the frames of the 1st Corps. However, this army could not develop because the Polish immigration on the British Islands was not very numerous. No Poles were arriving from the conquered by Germany and Italy Europe, and the voluntary recruitment in the United States, Canada and Latin America brought only a few thousand men. Situation changed when after the 3rd Reich's assault on the Soviet Union. The Polish government signed a treaty with the Soviets guaranteeing (among others) releasing the Polish citizens from prisons and camps and creating Polish Army. It was formed under the command of General Władysław Anders. In the spring of 1942 it amounted to more than 70 000 men but it suffered from the lack of officers. The pre-war Polish officers were looked for in vain because it was not known that they were executed two years earlier by NKVD. The Soviet authorities caused more and more trouble in expanding the army, for example by drastically limiting food rations to 40 000 portions a day. In the same time the situation of the Allies in the Middle East was very difficult, the United States had just begun mobilization, and the Great Britain ran out of reserves. In such conditions it was agreed to evacuate the Polish units to Persia, yet with the army some civilians left as well (mainly children and families of soldiers) - altogether some 114 tousand people.
From the forces moved to the Middle East (first to Persia, then to Iraq and Palestine) the 2nd Polish Corps emerged. In December 1943 and January 1944 it was transported to the Italian front. About 50 000 soldiers fought for almost year and a half, distinguishing themselves with glory, especially during the bloody struggle to break the Gustav Line. The key position there was the hill and monastery of Monte Cassino, captured by the Poles on May 18th, 1944. In July the Corps captured the city and port of Ancona, and in August participated in breaking the Gothic Line at the Adriatic Sea. In 1945 it took part in the spring offensive in the North of Italy, in battles of Faenza and Bolonia, which was first entered by the Polish soldiers. During the campaign in Italy some 2600 of them were killed.
The Polish forces stationed on the British Islands, reinforced by the soldiers who came from the Soviet Union, prepared to participate in the invasion of the continent. In June 1944, in the operation "Overlord" in Normandy, the Polish Air Force and the navy took part. Then the 1st Armored Division (under the command of Gen. Maczek), total of 16 000 men, 380 tanks and 470 guns was moved to France. It formed a part of the Canadian Corps and won fame in the battles of Falaise and Chambois (August 18th to 22nd, 1944) where it closed the "cauldron", cutting off the retreating German divisions. Later on it liberated the cities of Abeville, St. Omar and Cassel in France, Ypres and Gent in Belgium and Breda (October 28th to 30th, 1944) in the Netherlands, finally capturing the German seaport of Wilhelmshaven. Its combat route amounted to 1800 km, the division destroyed 260 enemy tanks and self-propelled guns, loosing 4600 soldiers, including more than a 1000 of casualties. In September 1944 the 1st Parachute Brigade was airdropped near Arnhem in the Netherlands as a part of the unfortunate "Market-Garden", suffering great losses.
When the war in Europe was coming to an end, the Polish troops fighting at the side of the Western Allies numbered more than 210 thousand soldiers, 1335 tanks, about 4000 of armored vehicles, 2050 guns and mortars, 32 thousand different mechanical vessels.
Basic bibliography:
Witold Biegański, Polskie Siły Zbrojne na Zachodzie, 1939-1945, Warszawa 1990;
Margaret Brodniewicz-Stawicki, For your freedom and ours: the Polish Armed Forces in the Second World War, St. Catharines, Ont, 1999.
Polish Army on the Eastern Front
After bringing into light the Katyn massacre and breaking off the diplomatic relations with Poland (April 1943), Stalin decided to organize Polish armed forces fighting at side of the Red Army. These troops emerged without the approval of the legal authorities of Poland, most of the commanding personnel were Soviet officers, the political officers recruited from the Polish communists but ordinary soldiers were Poles deported in the years 1939-1941 to the interior of the Soviet Union, and from the spring 1944, also the inhabitants of the Polish Kresy Wschodnie (Eastern Borderlands). Though its origin was not legal, and it played a significant role in imposing the communist system in Poland later on, the Polish Army fighting on the Eastern Front contributed a lot to the Polish military effort. From a single division (1st Tadeusz Kościuszko Infantry Division, commanded by colonel Zygmunt Berling) eleven-thousand-people strong, which began to form in May 1943, it expanded to one-hundred-thousand-people-strong army in July 1994, and at the end of the war it amounted to more than 330 thousand soldiers formed in two armies with all land forces arms (infantry, artillery, engineers, tanks and different supporting troops).
This army's baptism of fire took place at the battle of Lenino (Belarus) in October 1943. In July and August 1944 the Polish troops fought at the bridgeheads on the Western Bank of the Vistula River, and in the battle of Studzianki the Polish armored brigade fought its first battle against the Germans. In September 1944 the Polish Army attempted at helping the insurgents in Warsaw - unsuccessfully and with great losses. From January 1945 it participated in the great Soviet offensive: in February and March it fought a dramatic battle to break the Wał Pomorski (Pomeranian Position - the highly fortified German defense line) and capturing Kołobrzeg (Kolberg), a Baltic seaport transformed into a fortress; the Polish troops fought at Gdańsk and Gdynia, and also by Zalew Szczeciński (Bay of Szczecin). The crowning of the combat route was participation in capturing Berlin. In the entire operation took part 180 000 soldiers from the 1st and 2nd Polish Army, and in the assault in the downtown of Berlin an important role played the 1st Tadeusz Kościuszko Division. It was the only military unit besides the Red Army that stuck its national flag over the ruins of the German capital. Polish troops reached the Elba River and got in touch with American units. In April 1945, the 2nd Army forced the Nysa River, then fought in the region of Dresden and Bautzen, suffering great losses. Its combat route it ended in May in Czechoslovakia. In battles against the Germans on the Eastern Front participated also some Polish air units (however, they consisted mainly of Soviet pilots).
From the battle of Lenino till the combat over Elba and in Saxony 17 500 soldiers were killed, almost 10 000 were considered to be MIA. The most casualties cost the fighting in Pomorze (Pomerania - 5400 killed and 2800 MIA) and in the Berlin operation (7200 killed and 3800 MIA). Because of the combined nature of the Soviet and Polish actions it is difficult to estimate how much damage the Poles inflicted to the enemy. Some partial data is available only for a few battles: at Lenino 1800 Germans were killed, wounded or taken prisoner, in the tank battle at Studzianki the Germans lost 20 tanks and self-propelled guns and 1500 soldiers, at Wał Pomorski 2300 killed. In Berlin the soldiers of the Kościuszko Division captured four subway stations and took prisoner 2500 German soldiers.
The Polish Army fighting in the East was the greatest regular military force fighting at the side of the Red Army. Its almost two years long combat route added up to 1000 kilometers. It participated in different and important activities: forcing rivers, capturing cities, attacking fortifications, pursuing enemy troops. Its share in victory was paid dearly.
Basic bibliography:
Czesław Grzelak, Henryk Stańczyk, Stefan Zwoliński, Armia Berlinga i Żymierskiego. Wojsko polskie na froncie wschodnim 1943-1945, Warszawa 2002.
The „Enigma" and Intelligence
On July 25th 1939, before the war began, the Polish intelligence (Section 2 of the General Staff) provided Great Britain and France with one copy each (with necessary documents) of the German coding machine "Enigma" that allowed to read the secret German messages. A team of Polish cryptologists was evacuated to France, later on to England, where a special center for monitoring and decoding was organized in Bletchley Park. The Polish "Enigma" played a significant role, especially during the Battle of Britain, Battle of the Atlantic and the invasion of the continent in 1944. Other evacuated to England Polish scientists and technicians have to be mentioned as well. The electronics specialists helped with creating the submarine detection system (HFDF - High Frequency Direction Finding). The Polish engineers constructed the reversible tank periscope and an anti-aircraft cannon, with tens of thousands of which the British troops were equipped.
The Intelligence
Due to the impossibility of forming regular troops in the occupied Poland, a very important role in the Polish contribution to the anti-Nazi alliance played the intelligence which had a lot of experience in the territory of Germany from before war. During the conflict the Polish intelligence based on two centers: Section 2 of the Commander-in-Chief Staff, operating mainly in Western Europe and North Africa, and Section 2 of the AK Commanding Officer that worked mainly home and in Germany. Section 2 in London was the coordinator of all and had close contacts with correspondent British services, including Special Operations Executive (SOE) that dealt with intelligence and sabotage in occupied Europe. In August 1941 there was an agreement signed with the intelligence of the United States (OCI, later OSS). For some time in 1942 the AK intelligence had direct radio connection with the Red Army. Before that and later on, a lot of information from the Polish intelligence reached Moscow with the help of the British. The relations with the Allies were very important, because the Polish army could not use all the information gathered because of the limited own potential.
The intelligence commanded directly from London created - starting in September 1940 - a lot of posts, a network of which covered practically entire Western and Southern Europe and North Africa. The greatest and the most important was the network in France (Agency "F", later "F2"), that amounted to more than 2500 agents and only in the years 1940-1942 provided the center in London with more than 5200 reports. In 1944 the working in Paris network "Interallie" focused on the issues related to the invasion. There also existed the networks in Denmark, Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Palestine, Italy, in the Balkans and the Baltic states. Information sent by the network of the Agency "AFR" played an important role in planning the allied attack on the North Africa (Operation "Torch", December 1942). In France the intelligence network was closely related to a wider Polish conspiracy activity that had also subversion and propaganda tasks (Polska Organizacja Walki o Niepodległość - Polish Organization of Fight for Independence, aka "Monika").
The first intelligence structures in the occupied Polish territories emerged in the autumn of 1939, parallel in the framework of the ZWZ staff and upon individual initiatives. Of the latter ones the most important one is the organization "Muszkieterzy" (the Musketeers). The proper development of the intelligence activity began after the fall of France when it was realized that the war was going to last longer than expected. Section 2 was an extended structure with all the departments and services existing in military intelligence, both in the center in Warsaw, and in the AK regions and districts. It is estimated that within their framework some 15 000 people worked, and an important role was played by the employees of the post offices and railways. One of the most important elements were the posts working in Germany (general codename "Stragan" or the "Stall"), located (among other places) in Berlin, Hamburg, Cologne, Wienna, Konigsberg, Wroclaw (Breslau), and Szczecin (Stettin). The offensive intelligence of the "Stragan" (codename "Lombard", or the "Pawnshop") undertook also the sabotage actions, like bomb attempts. After the outbreak of the Soviet-German war, the intelligence in the East expanded (codename "Pralnia" or "Laundry") by organizing posts in Smolensk, Kharkiv, Riga and Daugavpils. In the spring of 1941 the Polish intelligence sent to Moscow via London some comprehensive reports on the German invasion plans.
The most spectacular achievement of the AK intelligence was a thorough study of the research center and factory in Pennemunde, where V1 and V2 missiles were produced. The first information was obtained in the autumn 1942 and in March 1943 a detailed report was sent to London. This allowed the British to conduct a massive bomb attack (night from August 17th to 18th, 1943) which for many months stopped the Wunderwaffe (Wonderful Weapon) construction plans. In 1944 the AK intelligence captured a missile that had not exploded during the drill and sent its parts to London. Quite a role played the data on localization of gasoline factories (operation "Synteza", or the "Syntesis") and the military facilities in Germany and Poland. The information on concentration and death camps was also sent. The materials sent by the Poles were very much appreciated by the partners. In the Intelligence Service evaluations it can be read that "the Polish intelligence provided a lot of very valuable information" (first half-year 1942), the estimations delivered by the AK "belong to the most precious ones that we get" (June 1944).
In total, from the second half of 1940 to the end of 1943 (the data for the later period is missing) from the network of the Polish intelligence more than 26 000 reports and a few thousand decoded German messages were delivered to the Allies.
Basic bibliography:
Władysław Kozaczuk, Jerzy Straszak, Enigma: how the Poles broke the Nazi code, New York 2004;
Piotr Matusak, Wywiad Związku Walki Zbrojnej - Armii Krajowej 1939-1945, Warszawa 2002;
Andrzej Pepłoński, Wywiad Polskich Sił Zbrojnych na Zachodzie, 1939-1945, Warszawa 1995.
A thought for the anniversary
Polish soldiers were not invited to participate in the victory defilades which took place in 1945 in London and Moscow. This meant that the Great Powers treated Poland more like an object of mutual relations than like a partner. However, the Western Allies many times emphasized the heroism and determination of the Polish soldiers and the fact that Poland was a very valuable ally, therefore belonging to the winners of the war. Many Poles thought, and still think, that it was a "bitter victory" because the Polish state that emerged after the war was harmed by subordinating it to the Soviet Union. Despite this no one seems to doubt that it was necessary to fight and the homage to those who fought, is paid by everyone.
Poland was the only country to fight in the European theatre of war from the first to the last day of the greatest armed conflict in the history of mankind. The war began with invading Poland: first, on September 1st, 1939, by the Nazi Germany, soon after, on September 17th, by the Soviet Union. Both invaders acted in concert, upon the Ribbentrop - Molotov Treaty (concluded on August 23rd). The allies of Poland - Great Britain and France - declared war upon Germany on September 3rd, but did not undertake any efficient military actions (the so-called "Phony War"). The Soviet Union joined the anti-Nazi alliance only in the summer of 1941, when invaded by Germany. The United States, although they gave a lot of significant material aid, joined the military actions within the frames of the coalition in December 1941 when assaulted by Japan and when Germany declared war upon them.
In the Polish contribution to the defeat of Germany in the first place we notice determination and perseverance: despite the severe defeat in 1939, the Poles formed armies five more times, including four outside of their country: in France in 1939, in the United Kingdom in the summer of 1940 (after the defeat and capitulation of France), in the USSR in 1941 (the army of Gen. Anders that fought later in the South of Europe), and then again in the Soviet Union in 1943 there emerged the one that later fought at the Red Army's side. The fifth Polish army, created at the end of September of 1939 was the conspiratorial armed force in the occupied territory. For the entire period of the war there also existed the very important "silent front" - the intelligence. Probably up to 2 millions Poles served since September 1st, 1939 to May 8th, 1945 in all the Polish military formations - regular armies, partisan troops and underground forces. In the final stage of war the Polish troops on all the European fronts amounted to some 600 thousands soldiers (infantry, armored troops, aircraft and navy), and in the summer of 1944 while entering the open fight with the retreating Germans, the armed underground numbered more than 300 thousands sworn soldiers. It can be concluded that Poland put in the field the fourth greatest Allied army.
Basic bibliography:
Józef Garliński, Poland in the Second World War, 1939-1945, London 1985
ed. Edward Pawłowski, Wojsko Polskie w II Wojnie Światowej, Warszawa 1995.
The 1939 Campaign
At the outbreak of the war, Polish army was able to put in the field almost one million soldiers, 2800 guns, 500 tanks and 400 aircraft. On the September 1st, the German forces set to war against Poland amounted to more than 1.5 million solders, 9000 guns, 2500 tanks and almost 2000 aircraft. The Red Army began the invasion sending in the first lot more than 620 000 soldiers, 4700 tanks and 3200 aircraft. Despite the overwhelming odds and the necessity of defense against the offensive in all directions, the Polish army fought for 35 days. Warsaw held until September 28th, the Polish garrison of Hel Peninsula for more than a month. The last battle against German troops took place on October 5th.
Polish losses in combat against Germans (killed and missing in action) amounted to ca. 70 000. 420 000 were taken prisoners. Losses against the Red Army added up to 6000 to 7000 of casualties and MIA, 250 000 were taken prisoners. Of these, almost all of the officers were murdered in the spring on 1940 in Katyn, Kharkiv and Tver upon Stalin's decision. Although the Polish army - considering the inactivity of the Allies - was in an unfavorable position - it managed to inflict serious losses to the enemies: 14 000 German soldiers were killed or MIA, 674 tanks and 319 armored vehicles destroyed or badly damaged, 230 aircraft shot down; the Red Army lost (killed and MIA) about 2500 soldiers, 150 combat vehicles and 20 aircraft. For many weeks Poland contained significant German forces, no advantage of this was taken by the Allies. Besides that, the necessity to reinforce the destroyed in Poland German military forces gave France and Great Britain more time to prepare to repulse invasion.
Basic bibliography:
Paweł Wieczorkiewicz, Kampania 1939 roku, Warszawa 2001;
Steven J. Zaloga, Poland 1939. The Birth of Blitzkrieg, London 2002;
Alexander B. Rossion, Hitler Strikes Poland. Blitzkrieg, Ideology, and Atrocity, Kansas 2003.
The underground army home
Home Army
In the night from September 26th to 27th, 1939, a day before Warsaw's capitulation, General Michał Karaszewicz-Tokarzewski received from the Commander-in-Chief of the Polish army (at the time interned in Romania) an order to create a military conspiracy. Over a few weeks he summoned up a group of officers who avoided captivity and from the scratch they built the most powerful underground army in the occupied Europe. The first name of it was Służba Zwycięstwu Polski (SZP - Polish Victory Service), later Związek Walki Zbrojnej (ZWZ - Union for Armed Struggle), and from February 1942 - Armia Krajowa (AK - Home Army). This resistance is widely known under this last name. The actual creator of the Home Army was Gen. Stefan Rowecki (also known as "Grot") who was the chief of staff first, and from June 1940 to June 1943 - the Commanding Officer. After his seizure by Gestapo, this post was taken by Gen. Tadeusz Komorowski (aka Bór). The Home Army, being a voluntary force, in the same time was both a part of Polskie Siły Zbrojne (PSZ - or PAF - Polish Armed Forces) whose high command was located in exile, and the most important element of the Polish Underground State. The main goal of the AK was preparation and conducting the national uprising in case of advancing frontlines or general collapse of the German armed forces. There were created suitable structures - staff, high commands of arms and services, territorial commands (regions, and on lower level - districts), weapons were collected, officers and soldiers trained, information about enemy gathered. However, because of the atrocious nature of the German occupation, public feelings and attitude, it was necessary to undertake daily struggle. Therefore the AK activities consisted of two strictly connected to each other parts: 1. the daily conspiratorial struggle, 2. the national uprising (during which the Home Army was supposed to recreate the full structure of armed forces).
Parallel to the official army there emerged military units of political parties, conspiracies based upon social organizations (e.g. upon the Fire Brigades emerged Skała, or "the Rock") and youth associations (e.g. Szare Szeregi, or "the Grey Ranks", based upon the Związek Harcerstwa Polskiego, or the "Polish Scouting Association"). They emerged thanks to the sabotage groups prepared by the General Staff before the war's outbreak. One of the tasks of the AK Commanding Officer was uniting them into one force. This took quite a lot of time. Eventually, only a part of radical nationalists (NSZ - Narodowe Siły Zbrojne - National Armed Forces) and, emerging up from the summer 1942 - military units of communist party remained out of the AK structures. In the spring of 1944, when the process of unification was ended, the Home Army numbered more than 300 thousand sworn soldiers.
Apart from the staff and territorial structures there existed special units dealing among others with subversion and sabotage. In April 1940 the Związek Odwetu emerged (ZO - Retaliation Union), later transformed into the Kierownictwo Dywersji (Kedyw - Subversion Command) which acted on central level and in each region. In September 1941, because of the change in the Polish-Soviet relations the organization "Wachlarz" (or the "Fan") was created. It dealt with intelligence and sabotage closely behind the German-Soviet frontlines. From January 1st 1941 to June 30th, 1944 within the frames of daily struggle the AK and subordinate units ditched among others 732 trains, set fire to 443 transports, destroyed about 4300 vehicles, burnt 130 magazines of weapons and equipments, damaged 19 000 train carriages and 6900 engines, set fire to 1200 gasoline tanks, blew up 40 railway bridges, destroyed 5 oil shafts, froze 3 blast-furnaces, conducted about 25 sabotage acts in war factories, 5700 attempts on officers of different police formations, soldiers and volksdeutschs (Polish citizens of German origin that volunteered to quisle with Germans), set free prisoners of 16 prisons. The partisan troops - active from 1943 - fought more than 170 combats, killing more than 1000 Germans. At the beginning of 1944 there were about 60 active AK partisan troops (some numbered up to a few hundred soldiers) and about 200 sabotage squads. The AK organized a few conspiratorial groups in some of the concentration camp (e.g. in Auschwitz) and among Poles sent to Germany for slave work. The runaway allied prisoners of war were also helped. A contact by radio and couriers with the Polish government in exile and the Commander-in-Chief staff was also maintained. There functioned permanent transfer bases (the most important one in Budapest) and courier routes (e.g. to Sweden). Since February 1942 began to arrive the trained in England Polish sabotage and intelligence officers (the so called "cichociemni" - literally the "silent and dark ones"). In total 316 of them were parachuted in Poland. There also was a subversion propaganda action going on, addressed to German soldiers (the so called Action "N"). The AK conducted some large publishing activities: there were about 250 newspapers edited, including the largest resistance title - "Biuletyn Informacyjny" (Information Bulletin), which was published from November 5th, 1939 up to January, 1945. Besides the "Biuletyn" there were also issued military books of rules, handbooks and manuals for the cadets of the underground military schools (some 8600 soldiers graduated from them). As it can be seen, there were many various activities going on. Their own contribution to fight against the occupation regime paid Żydowska Organizacja Bojowa (ŻOB - Jewish Fighting Organization) and the supported directly by the AK Żydowski Związek Wojskowy (ŻZW - Jewish Military Union) - mainly in the form of the heroic and desperate Warsaw Ghetto Uprising (April 19th - May 16th 1943).
To the most spectacular actions of the Home Army belong: paralyzing the railway junction in Warsaw (night from October 7th to 8th , 1942), recapturing the prisoners in Pińsk (January 18th, 1943), bomb assault in a city railway station in Berlin (February 15th, 1943), recapturing the prisoners in downtown Warsaw (the so-called Arsenal action, March 26th, 1943), assassination of Franz Kutschera, the SS and Police Commander for the District of Warsaw (February 1st, 1994).
It is estimated that until July, 1944 about 34 thousand soldiers of the Home Army and subordinate units were killed- some in combat but mostly they were executed or tortured to death in prisons - more or less 10% of the ranks. Among the "cichociemni" the losses added up to 1/3 of the ranks.
The Underground State
It was possible to build up the conspiratorial army to such a great size and manage for it to be so active only because it was closely connected with the Polskie Państwo Podziemne (PPP - the Polish Underground State) and civil resistance. The PPP was a unique phenomenon: in none of the European states there existed such a vast and differentiated structure. Besides the AK the main component of the PPP was Delegatura Rządu na Kraj (Government Delegate's Office at Home) which created a network of underground administration of all levels. The Kierownictwo Walki Cywilnej (Civil Fighting Executive) coordinated the activities of the so-called "little sabotage", undertook propaganda actions and activities aiming at maintaining the morale and spirit of resistance against Germany. A daily set of news was prepared for the Polish radio "Świt" (or the"Dawn") which broadcast from England but pretended to exist in Poland. The Kierownictwo also conducted secret education (including university level), helped the families of the victims of the invader and ran a separate action aiding the Jews ("Żegota"). It had its sections in prisons, by the post offices employees blocked the denunciations sent to German authorities, prepared plans for the after-war period and projects of running the territories that were expected to be captured on Germany (Biuro Ziem Nowych - the New Lands Office).
There existed secret courts (civil and military ones), which sentenced the traitors and punished Nazi collaborators with infamy. Another part of the PPP was the existing from 1940 representation of political parties which eventually was named Rada Jedności Narodowej (RJN, the Council for National Unity) and was a substitute of the parliament. The RJN published proclamations and program declarations (e.g. about the goals of war and future political system of the country). Besides the PPP there functioned hundreds of social, political and cultural associations, there were published more than two thousand books and brochures and more than 1.8 thousand different periodicals. Within the resistance but outside of the PPP were situated only extreme organizations: the NSZ on the right side and the communists on the left. Both these formations tried to create their own substitute of quasi-state structures.
"Burza" (the "Tempest")
The plans of national uprising, which was the main goal of the AK, were changed a few times. The first one emerged when there still existed the Soviet-German alliance, the second one when the Soviet Union joined the anti-Nazi coalition. The last one was elaborated in the autumn of 1943 after breaking off by Moscow the diplomatic relations with Poland and when it turned out for sure that the Polish territory would be first entered by the Red Army. In this plan the uprising received the codename "Burza" (the "Tempest"). It assumed that the very moment when the frontlines would advance close to Poland, all the troops and structures of the AK would be called up to arms under the names of the pre-war Polish Army units (divisions and regiments), and increase sabotage actions. But first of all, they would begin to fight openly the retreating German troops, trying to get in touch at tactical level with the Red Army. In captured cities the underground authorities would come to light (the region and district delegate offices), take over the power and welcome as hosts the entering Soviet troops. Thus the uprising was to be a successive action and not just a one-time appearance in the entire country.
"Burza" began on January 15th, 1944 with mobilization in Volhynia (the so-called "Polskie Kresy Wschodnie" - the Polish Eastern Borderlands) where local troops - transform into the 27th Volhynian Infantry Division of the AK - began actions against the Germans. However, when during the fights the AK units had to cross the frontlines, they were disarmed by NKVD (the Peoples Commissariat for Internal Affairs - Soviet secret political police). Despite the negative turnout, the AK High Command decided to continue the "Burza". More and more mobilized units entered the combat, and the greatest concentration of troops fought together with the Red Army in the battle of Vilnius (July 6th and 7th, 1944). A few days later the NKVD troops surrounded the Poles, disarmed them and interned. A part of them were able to manoeuvre out of encirclement. Again, the AK continued the insurgent action and its troops participated in capturing the subsequent cities and town: together with the Red Army in case of the big cities (like Lviv or Vilnius), or often on their own, in case of attacking some smaller German garrisons. For instance, in the region of Lublin, the AK units captured 7 cities on their own and 11 more together with the Soviets. The "Burza" covered a large territory from the Carpathians to Vilnius and the Lower Bug River, some 120 thousand soldiers fighting. On July 30th, 1944, Stalin ordered to disarm the AK, and the representatives of the Underground State that came out of the hiding and took over the offices were arrested. At least 20 to 30 thousand people were deported to penal colonies in the interior of the Soviet Union, most of them have never returned.
The Warsaw Uprising
Because of the experiences from the East and fears that fights in Warsaw would cause the destruction of the city and losses among the civil population, the opinions whether the "Burza" should take place varied. Eventually, it was decided that the battle of Warsaw would have not only the military significance but also political one. The emotional tension among the citizens and a hearty will to fight expressed by the AK soldiers were also taken into consideration. Finally the decision about starting the uprising in Warsaw was made (with participation of the Government Delegate Home and the head of RJN) on July 31st, when the advancing Red Army units were coming close to the lying on the eastern bank of the Vistula River city district of Praga. Some 23 000 of the AK soldiers started the uprising in the afternoon of August 1st, 1944, under the Warsaw Region Commanding Officer, colonel Antoni Chruściel (aka "Monter"). Although during the first few days of combat the insurgents captured a lot of strategic objects, and as the days went by the ranks were increasing (together there fought some 34 thousands of soldiers), the Home Army was unable to fully drive the Germans out of the downtown, nor to seize the main communication routes and bridges. The 16-thousand-strong German garrison was significantly reinforced (including the troops specializing in fighting partisans) and on August 5th, 1944, the Germans began to counter-strike, using tanks, heavy artillery and assault aircraft. In the first of recaptured districts (Wola), the German troops committed a mass slaughter of civilians. This was to happen again later a few times. The attacking German columns split Warsaw into the "insurgent islands", the contact between which was managed by secret passages through cellars and sewers. In these areas the authority was taken over by Polish administration, newspapers were published, a radio station broadcast ("Błyskawica", or the "Lightning"), municipal services worked.
It was expected that the battle would last a few more days, until the Red Army entered the city. Despite many pleas, including the ones from the Polish prime-minister who was paying a visit in Moscow since July 31st, sometime before August 8th, Stalin ordered to delay offensive actions nearby Warsaw. He did not even agree for the allied transport airplanes to land on Soviet airfields which practically precluded helping the uprising by airdropping the supplies, because the nearest airfields were located in England and Italy. Not till the middle of September, when the uprising was already on the verge of disaster, a mass air-drop was possible but the insurgents took over only some 47 tons of it. The battle dragged on, the death toll among the civilians increased, there lacked food, water and medicines. Capturing Praga by the Red Army and unsuccessful attempts of the Polish troops commanded by General Berling to establish a bridge-head in the left-bank Warsaw did not change the situation. On October 2nd, 1944, the insurgents capitulated. Some 150 000 civilians were killed, most of the city was utterly ruined (later on special German squads kept destroying the remaining buildings), 520 000 citizens expelled of the city. 17 000 insurgents were taken prisoners.
The Warsaw Uprising was the greatest battle fought by the Polish army in WW2: 10 000 soldiers were killed, 7 000 more were missing in action. Major losses were inflicted to Germans - 10 000 killed, 6 000 MIA, 300 tanks, guns and armored vehicles lost.
The uprising did not reach its military nor political objectives, yet for the generations of Poles to come it became a symbol of courage and determination in the struggle for independence.
Basic bibliography:
Norman Davies, Rising '44. "The Battle for Warsaw", London 2004;
Stefan Korboński, The Polish Underground State: A Guide to the Underground 1939-1945, Boulder 1979;
Marek Ney-Krwawicz, The Polish Home Army, 1939-1945, London 2001.
Polish Armed Forces in the West
The campaign in Poland had not finished yet when Polish troops abroad started to form. The government of Poland in exile that emerged in Paris adopted as its main goal the fight at the side of the Allies and creating a Polish army in France. This was the beginning of the Polskie Siły Zbrojne (PSZ - Polish Armed Forces) in the West which fought until May 1945 in three war theatres: Western Europe (1940 and 1944-1945), North Europe (1940) and Mediterranean (North Africa in 1940-1942, Italy 1944-1945). The first Commander-in-Chief was General Władysław Sikorski, who also was the Prime Minister of the government in exile. After his death (July 1943), his post was assigned to General Kazimierz Sosnkowski, dismissed in September 1944. After him General Tadeusz Komorowski, the AK Commanding Officer was appointed who after the Warsaw Uprising defeat became a German prisoner of war.
Campaign in France
Polish troops emerged of a stream of soldiers and officers that reached France through Romania, Hungary, Lithuania and Latvia. 43 000 evacuated, the rest of them ran away on their own. Also the Polish immigrants living in France applied to the army. In a few months the Polish Army reached the number of 84 000 soldiers in four infantry divisions and two brigades. There were also formed four air squadrons and units of anti-aircraft artillery that amounted to about 7 000 people. Besides, a part of withdrawing troops found their way to Syria (administrated by the French) where Samodzielna Brygada Strzelców Karpackich emerged (Independent Carpathian Riflemen Brigade).
During the German Blitzkrieg in France in May 1940 the Allied defense broke already after two weeks which was the reason for a hasty withdrawal of the British troops and capitulation of France. Polish units fought in the southern section of the front: the Polish Grenadier Division after one week of fighting was dissolved because of the French-German armistice talks; the soldiers of the Brygada Kawalerii Pancerno-Motorowej (Armoured Cavalry Brigade) after the battles of Champaubert and Montbard upon the order of their commander, General Maczek, destroyed their equipment and withdrew south; 2 Dywizja Strzelców (2nd Riflemen Division) stopped the German attack on the Clos-du-Doubs hills but when on June 19th it turned out that the fight is almost over, it crossed the Swiss border and was interned there. The Samodzielna Brygada Strzelców Podhalańskich (Indipendent Podhalan Riflemen Brigade) was included in Allied forces sent to Norway in May 1940 and participated in the battle of Narvik. Altogether, about 50 000 Polish soldiers fought defending France, 1400 were killed, more than 4500 were wounded. Polish fighter pilots achieved 50 confirmed and 5 probable kills of enemy aircraft. The defeat of France meant the defeat of the Polish troops fighting at the side of the French. Only about 20 000 men were able to withdraw to England. The great organizational effort made since the autumn 1939 was wasted.
Battle of Britain and the Polish Air Force
The Polish pilots stood out during the campaign of 1939 and highlighted during the campaign in France. But the most distinguished role they played in 1940 when the decisive for the fate of the England and the coalition Battle of Britain took place (August 8th - October 31st, 1940). The British industry produced enough aircraft but it was not possible to train enough pilots in such a short time. Therefore the role of foreign airmen, of whom the greatest group formed the 151 Polish pilots, cannot be overemphasized. They fought both in the British and Polish squadrons (302nd and 303rd fighter and 300th and 301st bomber squadrons). During the Battle of Britain the Poles shot down 203 Luftwaffe aircraft which stood for 12% of total German losses in this battle. The success of the Polish pilots inclined the British command to expand the Polish Air Force: until summer 1941 8 fighter and 4 bomber squadrons emerged. Later on new ones were created, including the Polish Fighting Team (commonly called the "Skalski's circus", named derived from its commander's surname) that fought in North Africa. Polish pilots protected England, e.g. by destroying 193 German V1 and V2 missiles, and participated in many operations over the continent, escorting the bombers, bombing different targets (e.g. Ruhr, Hamburg, Brema), provided air support to the landing troops during the invasion in June 1944. In 1944 the Polish air unit operating from Italy airdropped in Poland men and equipment for the AK, and during the Warsaw Uprising the Polish crews flew 91 times with the supplies for the fighting insurgents. From 1940 to 1945 the Polish squadrons and the Polish pilots serving in British units achieved 621 confirmed kills, and together with campaigns of 1939 and France- 900 confirmed and 189 probable.
Basic bibliography:
Lenne Olson, Stanley Cloud, A Question of Honour. The Kosciuszko squadron: forgotten heroes of World War II, New York, 2003;
Adam Zamoyski, The Forgotten Few: The Polish Air Force in the Second World War, New York 1996.
The Battle of Atlantic and the Polish navy
Just before war's outbreak three Polish destroyers (Błyskawica, Burza and Grom) left for Great Britain. Later on they were joined by the submarines Orzeł and Wilk that managed to escape the Germans. The Polish Navy since 1940 was constantly expanded by the ships leased from the Royal Navy and in 1945 it amounted to 4 thousand seamen on 15 ships (1 cruiser, 6 destroyers, 3 submarines and 5 torpedo boats). During the war there served 26 ships (2 cruisers, 9 destroyers, 5 submarines and 11 torpedo boats). At the side of the British and American fleets, the Polish vessels participated in tens of operations: e.g. in May 1940 in Narvik, during the evacuation from Dunkirk, in 1944 during the landing in Normandy (operation "Overlord"), escorting convoys to Murmansk and Malta but most of all in the Battle of the Atlantic which took place from 1940 to 1944, including the famous "hunt for Bismarck", the greatest Kriegsmarine battleship (May 1941). Totally, they participated in 665 battles and escorted 787 convoys, sunk 12 enemy ships (including 5 submarines) and 41 merchant vessels, damaged 24 more (including 8 submarines). Besides that the Allied sea transport was reinforced with 36 Polish merchant vessels which 1939 were abroad, total displacement of 117 thousand tons.
Basic bibliography:
Michael A. Peszke, Poland's Navy 1918-1945, New York 1999;
Jerzy Pertek, Mała flota wielka duchem, Poznań 1989.
Land battles 1941-1945
After the defeat of France, the Carpathian Riflemen Brigade left Syria and joined the British forces in Egypt. It was an excellent unit of 5 000 men, mainly experienced soldiers, the 1939 veterans and volunteers. In August 1941 it moved to Libya where it won fame in the heavy fights during the defense of the besieged Tobruk, and in the spring of 1942 in the Libyan Desert.
About 20 00 men managed to withdraw from France to Great Britain. They formed 1st Polish Corps that was supposed to defend the eastern coast of Scotland, and 1st Independent Parachute Brigade that was supposed to be airdropped in Poland once the national uprising began. In 1941 1st Armored Division was created within the frames of the 1st Corps. However, this army could not develop because the Polish immigration on the British Islands was not very numerous. No Poles were arriving from the conquered by Germany and Italy Europe, and the voluntary recruitment in the United States, Canada and Latin America brought only a few thousand men. Situation changed when after the 3rd Reich's assault on the Soviet Union. The Polish government signed a treaty with the Soviets guaranteeing (among others) releasing the Polish citizens from prisons and camps and creating Polish Army. It was formed under the command of General Władysław Anders. In the spring of 1942 it amounted to more than 70 000 men but it suffered from the lack of officers. The pre-war Polish officers were looked for in vain because it was not known that they were executed two years earlier by NKVD. The Soviet authorities caused more and more trouble in expanding the army, for example by drastically limiting food rations to 40 000 portions a day. In the same time the situation of the Allies in the Middle East was very difficult, the United States had just begun mobilization, and the Great Britain ran out of reserves. In such conditions it was agreed to evacuate the Polish units to Persia, yet with the army some civilians left as well (mainly children and families of soldiers) - altogether some 114 tousand people.
From the forces moved to the Middle East (first to Persia, then to Iraq and Palestine) the 2nd Polish Corps emerged. In December 1943 and January 1944 it was transported to the Italian front. About 50 000 soldiers fought for almost year and a half, distinguishing themselves with glory, especially during the bloody struggle to break the Gustav Line. The key position there was the hill and monastery of Monte Cassino, captured by the Poles on May 18th, 1944. In July the Corps captured the city and port of Ancona, and in August participated in breaking the Gothic Line at the Adriatic Sea. In 1945 it took part in the spring offensive in the North of Italy, in battles of Faenza and Bolonia, which was first entered by the Polish soldiers. During the campaign in Italy some 2600 of them were killed.
The Polish forces stationed on the British Islands, reinforced by the soldiers who came from the Soviet Union, prepared to participate in the invasion of the continent. In June 1944, in the operation "Overlord" in Normandy, the Polish Air Force and the navy took part. Then the 1st Armored Division (under the command of Gen. Maczek), total of 16 000 men, 380 tanks and 470 guns was moved to France. It formed a part of the Canadian Corps and won fame in the battles of Falaise and Chambois (August 18th to 22nd, 1944) where it closed the "cauldron", cutting off the retreating German divisions. Later on it liberated the cities of Abeville, St. Omar and Cassel in France, Ypres and Gent in Belgium and Breda (October 28th to 30th, 1944) in the Netherlands, finally capturing the German seaport of Wilhelmshaven. Its combat route amounted to 1800 km, the division destroyed 260 enemy tanks and self-propelled guns, loosing 4600 soldiers, including more than a 1000 of casualties. In September 1944 the 1st Parachute Brigade was airdropped near Arnhem in the Netherlands as a part of the unfortunate "Market-Garden", suffering great losses.
When the war in Europe was coming to an end, the Polish troops fighting at the side of the Western Allies numbered more than 210 thousand soldiers, 1335 tanks, about 4000 of armored vehicles, 2050 guns and mortars, 32 thousand different mechanical vessels.
Basic bibliography:
Witold Biegański, Polskie Siły Zbrojne na Zachodzie, 1939-1945, Warszawa 1990;
Margaret Brodniewicz-Stawicki, For your freedom and ours: the Polish Armed Forces in the Second World War, St. Catharines, Ont, 1999.
Polish Army on the Eastern Front
After bringing into light the Katyn massacre and breaking off the diplomatic relations with Poland (April 1943), Stalin decided to organize Polish armed forces fighting at side of the Red Army. These troops emerged without the approval of the legal authorities of Poland, most of the commanding personnel were Soviet officers, the political officers recruited from the Polish communists but ordinary soldiers were Poles deported in the years 1939-1941 to the interior of the Soviet Union, and from the spring 1944, also the inhabitants of the Polish Kresy Wschodnie (Eastern Borderlands). Though its origin was not legal, and it played a significant role in imposing the communist system in Poland later on, the Polish Army fighting on the Eastern Front contributed a lot to the Polish military effort. From a single division (1st Tadeusz Kościuszko Infantry Division, commanded by colonel Zygmunt Berling) eleven-thousand-people strong, which began to form in May 1943, it expanded to one-hundred-thousand-people-strong army in July 1994, and at the end of the war it amounted to more than 330 thousand soldiers formed in two armies with all land forces arms (infantry, artillery, engineers, tanks and different supporting troops).
This army's baptism of fire took place at the battle of Lenino (Belarus) in October 1943. In July and August 1944 the Polish troops fought at the bridgeheads on the Western Bank of the Vistula River, and in the battle of Studzianki the Polish armored brigade fought its first battle against the Germans. In September 1944 the Polish Army attempted at helping the insurgents in Warsaw - unsuccessfully and with great losses. From January 1945 it participated in the great Soviet offensive: in February and March it fought a dramatic battle to break the Wał Pomorski (Pomeranian Position - the highly fortified German defense line) and capturing Kołobrzeg (Kolberg), a Baltic seaport transformed into a fortress; the Polish troops fought at Gdańsk and Gdynia, and also by Zalew Szczeciński (Bay of Szczecin). The crowning of the combat route was participation in capturing Berlin. In the entire operation took part 180 000 soldiers from the 1st and 2nd Polish Army, and in the assault in the downtown of Berlin an important role played the 1st Tadeusz Kościuszko Division. It was the only military unit besides the Red Army that stuck its national flag over the ruins of the German capital. Polish troops reached the Elba River and got in touch with American units. In April 1945, the 2nd Army forced the Nysa River, then fought in the region of Dresden and Bautzen, suffering great losses. Its combat route it ended in May in Czechoslovakia. In battles against the Germans on the Eastern Front participated also some Polish air units (however, they consisted mainly of Soviet pilots).
From the battle of Lenino till the combat over Elba and in Saxony 17 500 soldiers were killed, almost 10 000 were considered to be MIA. The most casualties cost the fighting in Pomorze (Pomerania - 5400 killed and 2800 MIA) and in the Berlin operation (7200 killed and 3800 MIA). Because of the combined nature of the Soviet and Polish actions it is difficult to estimate how much damage the Poles inflicted to the enemy. Some partial data is available only for a few battles: at Lenino 1800 Germans were killed, wounded or taken prisoner, in the tank battle at Studzianki the Germans lost 20 tanks and self-propelled guns and 1500 soldiers, at Wał Pomorski 2300 killed. In Berlin the soldiers of the Kościuszko Division captured four subway stations and took prisoner 2500 German soldiers.
The Polish Army fighting in the East was the greatest regular military force fighting at the side of the Red Army. Its almost two years long combat route added up to 1000 kilometers. It participated in different and important activities: forcing rivers, capturing cities, attacking fortifications, pursuing enemy troops. Its share in victory was paid dearly.
Basic bibliography:
Czesław Grzelak, Henryk Stańczyk, Stefan Zwoliński, Armia Berlinga i Żymierskiego. Wojsko polskie na froncie wschodnim 1943-1945, Warszawa 2002.
The „Enigma" and Intelligence
On July 25th 1939, before the war began, the Polish intelligence (Section 2 of the General Staff) provided Great Britain and France with one copy each (with necessary documents) of the German coding machine "Enigma" that allowed to read the secret German messages. A team of Polish cryptologists was evacuated to France, later on to England, where a special center for monitoring and decoding was organized in Bletchley Park. The Polish "Enigma" played a significant role, especially during the Battle of Britain, Battle of the Atlantic and the invasion of the continent in 1944. Other evacuated to England Polish scientists and technicians have to be mentioned as well. The electronics specialists helped with creating the submarine detection system (HFDF - High Frequency Direction Finding). The Polish engineers constructed the reversible tank periscope and an anti-aircraft cannon, with tens of thousands of which the British troops were equipped.
The Intelligence
Due to the impossibility of forming regular troops in the occupied Poland, a very important role in the Polish contribution to the anti-Nazi alliance played the intelligence which had a lot of experience in the territory of Germany from before war. During the conflict the Polish intelligence based on two centers: Section 2 of the Commander-in-Chief Staff, operating mainly in Western Europe and North Africa, and Section 2 of the AK Commanding Officer that worked mainly home and in Germany. Section 2 in London was the coordinator of all and had close contacts with correspondent British services, including Special Operations Executive (SOE) that dealt with intelligence and sabotage in occupied Europe. In August 1941 there was an agreement signed with the intelligence of the United States (OCI, later OSS). For some time in 1942 the AK intelligence had direct radio connection with the Red Army. Before that and later on, a lot of information from the Polish intelligence reached Moscow with the help of the British. The relations with the Allies were very important, because the Polish army could not use all the information gathered because of the limited own potential.
The intelligence commanded directly from London created - starting in September 1940 - a lot of posts, a network of which covered practically entire Western and Southern Europe and North Africa. The greatest and the most important was the network in France (Agency "F", later "F2"), that amounted to more than 2500 agents and only in the years 1940-1942 provided the center in London with more than 5200 reports. In 1944 the working in Paris network "Interallie" focused on the issues related to the invasion. There also existed the networks in Denmark, Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Palestine, Italy, in the Balkans and the Baltic states. Information sent by the network of the Agency "AFR" played an important role in planning the allied attack on the North Africa (Operation "Torch", December 1942). In France the intelligence network was closely related to a wider Polish conspiracy activity that had also subversion and propaganda tasks (Polska Organizacja Walki o Niepodległość - Polish Organization of Fight for Independence, aka "Monika").
The first intelligence structures in the occupied Polish territories emerged in the autumn of 1939, parallel in the framework of the ZWZ staff and upon individual initiatives. Of the latter ones the most important one is the organization "Muszkieterzy" (the Musketeers). The proper development of the intelligence activity began after the fall of France when it was realized that the war was going to last longer than expected. Section 2 was an extended structure with all the departments and services existing in military intelligence, both in the center in Warsaw, and in the AK regions and districts. It is estimated that within their framework some 15 000 people worked, and an important role was played by the employees of the post offices and railways. One of the most important elements were the posts working in Germany (general codename "Stragan" or the "Stall"), located (among other places) in Berlin, Hamburg, Cologne, Wienna, Konigsberg, Wroclaw (Breslau), and Szczecin (Stettin). The offensive intelligence of the "Stragan" (codename "Lombard", or the "Pawnshop") undertook also the sabotage actions, like bomb attempts. After the outbreak of the Soviet-German war, the intelligence in the East expanded (codename "Pralnia" or "Laundry") by organizing posts in Smolensk, Kharkiv, Riga and Daugavpils. In the spring of 1941 the Polish intelligence sent to Moscow via London some comprehensive reports on the German invasion plans.
The most spectacular achievement of the AK intelligence was a thorough study of the research center and factory in Pennemunde, where V1 and V2 missiles were produced. The first information was obtained in the autumn 1942 and in March 1943 a detailed report was sent to London. This allowed the British to conduct a massive bomb attack (night from August 17th to 18th, 1943) which for many months stopped the Wunderwaffe (Wonderful Weapon) construction plans. In 1944 the AK intelligence captured a missile that had not exploded during the drill and sent its parts to London. Quite a role played the data on localization of gasoline factories (operation "Synteza", or the "Syntesis") and the military facilities in Germany and Poland. The information on concentration and death camps was also sent. The materials sent by the Poles were very much appreciated by the partners. In the Intelligence Service evaluations it can be read that "the Polish intelligence provided a lot of very valuable information" (first half-year 1942), the estimations delivered by the AK "belong to the most precious ones that we get" (June 1944).
In total, from the second half of 1940 to the end of 1943 (the data for the later period is missing) from the network of the Polish intelligence more than 26 000 reports and a few thousand decoded German messages were delivered to the Allies.
Basic bibliography:
Władysław Kozaczuk, Jerzy Straszak, Enigma: how the Poles broke the Nazi code, New York 2004;
Piotr Matusak, Wywiad Związku Walki Zbrojnej - Armii Krajowej 1939-1945, Warszawa 2002;
Andrzej Pepłoński, Wywiad Polskich Sił Zbrojnych na Zachodzie, 1939-1945, Warszawa 1995.
A thought for the anniversary
Polish soldiers were not invited to participate in the victory defilades which took place in 1945 in London and Moscow. This meant that the Great Powers treated Poland more like an object of mutual relations than like a partner. However, the Western Allies many times emphasized the heroism and determination of the Polish soldiers and the fact that Poland was a very valuable ally, therefore belonging to the winners of the war. Many Poles thought, and still think, that it was a "bitter victory" because the Polish state that emerged after the war was harmed by subordinating it to the Soviet Union. Despite this no one seems to doubt that it was necessary to fight and the homage to those who fought, is paid by everyone.
THE LIST OF POLISH ENVOYS TO IRAN AND IRANIAN ENVOYS TO POLAND
THE LIST OF POLISH ENVOYS TO IRAN AND IRANIAN ENVOYS TO POLAND
AFTER THE SECOND WORLD WAR
Polish Envoys to Iran
1
Envoy Kazimierz Sidor - from 20.12.1956
2
Envoy Władysław Góralski - from 03.12.1960
3
Amb. Władysław Góralski - from 16.07.1962
4
Amb. Stanisław Kwiryluk - from 09.03.1964
5
Amb. Bronisław Musielak - from 08.10.1969
6
Amb. Bogusław Paszek - from 05.09.1973
7
Amb. Henryk Łaszcz - from 06.01.1976
8
Amb. Józef Filipowicz - from 27.11.1979
9
Amb. Jan Słowikowski - from 06.09.1983
10
Ch. d´aff. a. i. Bolesław Bukowski - from 18.10.1984
11
Amb. Tadeusz Kohorewicz - from 27.03.1985
12
Amb. Stefan Szymczykiewicz - from 08.11.1988
13
Ch. d´aff. Antoni Grzelak - from 1994
14
Ch. d´aff. Stefan Stefański - from 26.07.1996
15
Amb. Witold Waszczykowski - from 01.08.1999
16
Amb. Witold Śmidowski - from 24.10.2002
Iranian Envoys to Poland
1
Ch. d´aff. a. i. Abbas Ali Khalatbari - from 12.03.1948
2
Envoy Fazollah Nabile - from 09.09.1948
3
Envoy Ismail Medjdi - from 16.08.1951
4
Envoy Bagher Fahimi - from 17.04.1956
5
Envoy Amir Rachidi-Haeri - from 30.06.1958
6
Envoy Abbas Ali Khalatbari - from 07.03.1960
7
Envoy Mohsen M. Esfandiari - from 18.01.1962
8
Amb. Mohsen M. Esfandiari - from 28.07.1962
9
Amb. Homyoun Samii - from 27.09.1965
10
Amb. Ali Akbar Farouhandeh - from 28.08.1967
11
Amb. Fereydoun Diba - from 22.01.1970
12
Amb. Soltan Hossein Vekili Sanandaji - from 02.02.1974
13
Amb. Akbar Darai - from 17.07.1976
14
Amb. Houshang Amir-Mokry - from 27.10.1978
15
Ch. d´aff. a. i. Abdfazl Rahnama Hazavei - from 06.04. 1983
16
Amb. Abdfazl Rahnama Hazavei - from 28.02.1984
17
Amb. Kyoumars Fotouhi-Ghiyam - from 24.03.1989
18
Amb. Reza Astaneh-Parast - from 05.10.1993
19
Amb. Mohammad Taheri - from 22.10.1996
20
Amb. Sayed Mousa Kazemi - from 07.01.2000
21
Amb. Mohammad Mehdi Pourmohammadi - from 07.01.2004
AFTER THE SECOND WORLD WAR
Polish Envoys to Iran
1
Envoy Kazimierz Sidor - from 20.12.1956
2
Envoy Władysław Góralski - from 03.12.1960
3
Amb. Władysław Góralski - from 16.07.1962
4
Amb. Stanisław Kwiryluk - from 09.03.1964
5
Amb. Bronisław Musielak - from 08.10.1969
6
Amb. Bogusław Paszek - from 05.09.1973
7
Amb. Henryk Łaszcz - from 06.01.1976
8
Amb. Józef Filipowicz - from 27.11.1979
9
Amb. Jan Słowikowski - from 06.09.1983
10
Ch. d´aff. a. i. Bolesław Bukowski - from 18.10.1984
11
Amb. Tadeusz Kohorewicz - from 27.03.1985
12
Amb. Stefan Szymczykiewicz - from 08.11.1988
13
Ch. d´aff. Antoni Grzelak - from 1994
14
Ch. d´aff. Stefan Stefański - from 26.07.1996
15
Amb. Witold Waszczykowski - from 01.08.1999
16
Amb. Witold Śmidowski - from 24.10.2002
Iranian Envoys to Poland
1
Ch. d´aff. a. i. Abbas Ali Khalatbari - from 12.03.1948
2
Envoy Fazollah Nabile - from 09.09.1948
3
Envoy Ismail Medjdi - from 16.08.1951
4
Envoy Bagher Fahimi - from 17.04.1956
5
Envoy Amir Rachidi-Haeri - from 30.06.1958
6
Envoy Abbas Ali Khalatbari - from 07.03.1960
7
Envoy Mohsen M. Esfandiari - from 18.01.1962
8
Amb. Mohsen M. Esfandiari - from 28.07.1962
9
Amb. Homyoun Samii - from 27.09.1965
10
Amb. Ali Akbar Farouhandeh - from 28.08.1967
11
Amb. Fereydoun Diba - from 22.01.1970
12
Amb. Soltan Hossein Vekili Sanandaji - from 02.02.1974
13
Amb. Akbar Darai - from 17.07.1976
14
Amb. Houshang Amir-Mokry - from 27.10.1978
15
Ch. d´aff. a. i. Abdfazl Rahnama Hazavei - from 06.04. 1983
16
Amb. Abdfazl Rahnama Hazavei - from 28.02.1984
17
Amb. Kyoumars Fotouhi-Ghiyam - from 24.03.1989
18
Amb. Reza Astaneh-Parast - from 05.10.1993
19
Amb. Mohammad Taheri - from 22.10.1996
20
Amb. Sayed Mousa Kazemi - from 07.01.2000
21
Amb. Mohammad Mehdi Pourmohammadi - from 07.01.2004
Polish-Persian Diplomatic Relations during the Safavid Period
Polish-Persian Diplomatic Relations during the Safavid Period
Developing of Polish-Persian relations was the result of the new conceptions shaping the political order in Europe after the waning of the Middle Ages and the demise of the idea of the "Christian Commonwealth".
The turning point in the political awareness of Europe, was the growth of the Ottoman Empire's might which threaten not only Persia, its archenemy of long standing, but also all countries of south-eastern Europe. A tangible fear of the nascent power of Turkey resulted in forming by the European powers alliances transcending religious divides, among other countries with Persia. The ever-developing political configurations led to gradual emergence of the diplomatic service. By gist of such diplomatic exchanges, treaties, commercial intercourse, and developing travel links, Poland as a part of Christian Europe, developed diplomatic relations with Persia.
Diplomatic missions began setting out from Europe to Persia with increasing frequency. Negotiations were held with Uzun Hasan (1453-1478) through the intermediation of catholic missionaries. European envoys carrying letters to be passed on used to arrive in Poland on their way to or from Persia. In 1474 a mission from Persia arrived at the court of Kazimierz Jagiellończyk (1447-1492), the first one to do so in the history of official contacts between both countries. The delegation was headed by Ambrosio Contarini, legate of the Venetian Republic. In a letter from Shah Uzun Hassan the Polish king was assured of the shah's friendship and was asked to provide military assistance in the fight against the Turkish Sultan Mehmed II. The Persian hope was that Poland can be enlisted in attacking Turkey from two sides, from the east and west.
Kazimierz Jagiellończyk, however, declined the offer made by Uzun Hassan. His foreign policy was one of avoiding direct confrontation with the Turks and, at least as importantly, of maintaining his alliance with the Crimean Tartars. The Polish monarch was also anxious to protect Moldavia - while sparsely populated and bare - it was of considerable strategic importance. It constituted a natural buffer protecting the approach to Poland. "If Moldavia is defended, the Crown will be defended as well" Primate Zbigniew Oleśnicki used to repeat. So Poland's diplomats strove to maintain some semblance of good relations with the Ottomans, and the envisaged anti-Turkish coalition came to naught. The fact is that the mission of Ambrosio Contarini started the development of diplomatic relations between Poland and Persia, the latter for centuries being perceived as a potential ally in the fight against the Turkish domination.
The 16th century brought a renewed threat on the part of Turkey which, having completed a series of conquests in Asia and Africa, undertook a push towards Europe; this was the reign of Sultan Suleyman I the Magnificent (1520-1566). Soon, the idea of an anti-Turkish alliance incorporating Persia was again circulating in the halls of power. European states had already made advances in this direction earlier, during the reign of King Zygmunt I (1506-1548), seeking to gain Persia's acquiescence. In reply, the Persians dispatched (in 1516) an envoy to Poland - Petrus de Monte Libano, a Maronite monk from Syria. Petrus carried letters from the Shah addressed to the European monarchs in which the drawing up of anti-Turkish treaties was proposed. The Polish king, however, displayed limited enthusiasm for similar solutions; in spite of low-intensity aggressive actions on the part of the Turks, he adhered to a policy of maintaining sound relations at all costs.
The attitude of Polish monarchs in that geopolitical game can be evaluated as reasonable, because the situation in Polish Commonwealth was somewhat different at that time than in other European countries. The Muslims and their culture were not some unknown, mysterious, and exotic world but, rather, a real-life presence. Many Muslims lived in Poland. Muslim Tartars played an important role in the country's political life; the Armenians settling in Poland continued to use Turkish (in the form of an Armenian-Kipchak dialect) and, in many instances, also Persian.
The diplomatic relation between Poland and Persia based on a wide anti-Turkish alliance once again enliven during the Safavid period. The idea was very popular in Europe and accepted by Polish king Stefan Batory (1576-1586) who was planning a great crusade leading through Moscow and on to Istanbul. The negotiations in this regard were carried on with the Persian shah. The mutual diplomacy was very active. It is reputed that negotiations in this regard were carried on with the Persian shah through the intermediation of Marcin Broniowski. This secretary to the king, much experienced in diplomatic negotiations, is supposed to have sojourned at the court of the Persian shah, Mohammed Khodabande (1577-1581) on a mission. Yet the far-reaching plans of the combative king came to naught, interrupted as they were by the sudden death of Stefan Batory in 1586. The friendly relations between Poland and Persia struck up during this time, however, survived, assuming a special character during the reign of his successor, King Zygmunt III Vasa (1587-1632). The escalating conflict with the Ottoman Porte brought an end to the lively commercial exchange with the Turkish cities, and it became necessary for Poland to seek new markets as well as allies for her military endeavours; Persia was a natural, if geographically distant, candidate.
Contacts were very much eased by the policy of tolerance pursued by Abbas I the Great with regard to the Jews and Christians living in Persia. The Safavid court began to solicit foreign advisors; their knowledge and skills were held in great esteem. These included - the Polish Jesuit Tadeusz Krusiński. This enlivening of diplomatic relations with Persia meant that Poland, always a convenient transit point on the East-West trail, became frequent host to passing diplomatic missions.
Safavid Persia, led by its energetic ruler, stood open for an alliance with the Christian states and for friendly relations with the Polish Commonwealth. The successful mission of the Polish merchant-cum-diplomat, Sefer Muratowicz, confirmed that. In 1601, the king Zygmunt III Vaza, a consummate lover of the arts, sent Sefer Muratowicz - an Armenian living in Warsaw, supplier of carpets to the royal court - on the long voyage to Persia, more specifically to Kashan, a major carpet-making centre. The instructions issued to Muratowicz were simple enough: he was to order carpets with the King's coat-of-arms from the local craftsmen. In the opinion of many historians this expedition to Persia, had political goals in addition to its overt commercial objectives.
Surviving in part to this day is the account of Sefer Muratowicz's journey in which he describes his contacts with the highest Persian officials as well as with the Shah himself. His was the first Polish report to dwell in such detail on the relations prevailing in Persia's ruling house.
What was ostensibly a commercial journey did not arouse the suspicions of Poland's enemies and Muratowicz, carrying an assortment of letters of safe passage, was allowed to continue eastwards unmolested. After 158 days on the trail, Muratowicz safely reached Kashan and set about procuring the carpets requested by his monarch: "There, I had made for His Majesty the King a few carpets with silk and with gold, also a tent and a damascene sabre". Some of the carpets brought back by Muratowicz were incorporated into the dowry of the king's daughter and are preserved at Munich's Residenz Museum to this day.
In addition to its commercial dimension, the voyage of Sefer Muratowicz had a less patent purpose - a diplomatic one. The opinion of many historians is that the main purpose of his trip lay in sounding out the real Persian attitudes with regard to the anti-Turkish league, in assessing her military potential, and in appraising the possibilities for establishing permanent diplomatic relations between the Polish Commonwealth and Persia. Muratowicz was also charged with mapping out the safest and most direct route between Poland and Persia for use by the anticipated papal mission as well as with exploring the feasibility of attempting missionary activity in the land. Muratowicz, taking advantage of his command of the Persian language and of his familiarity with the Orient, disposed himself very well, gaining the favour of the shah. In his account, Muratowicz proudly recounts the words addressed by Persia's supreme ruler to the vizier: "Haten beg, I have had in my halls many different envoys, Muscovite, English, Venetian, and papal, but with none was I more content than with this man with whom I can converse in my own language - one has little taste for speaking through an interpreter".
During the next years other missions were sent by the Persian shah to mount a join defence against the Turkish onslaught. In Polish archives in Warsaw we can find interesting letter of Shah Abbas the I to Polish king Zygmunt the III. The shah personally reaffirmed his friendship and his desire to work together with Poland. The letter was delivered to the court of Zygmunt III by Mahdi Kuli Bek Turkman, royal dragoman, in 1605. Shah Abbas I declared his friendship, recounted his recent military victories, and proposed an alliance against the Turks, making much of their status as a common enemy. In this letter, the shah writes "we recount this so that friendship and love arise between us two lords, as deep as it does between the Christian lords. The Turk is a foe to us as well as to all you Christians". These portentous developments notwithstanding, history again foiled the plans for a joint anti-Turkish undertaking. Resolutions adopted by the Polish Parliament (Sejm) in 1605 and 1606 with a view to securing peace with the Ottoman Porte pushed the perspective of joint military enterprises with the Persians further away.
Despite other missions sent by the Persian shah to mount a join defense against the Turkish onslaught, Zygmunt III was loath to wage war on Turkey; his reply to the shah, while courteous and teeming with protestations of friendship, was rather short on specifics concerning the proposed anti-Turkish effort. Subsequent overtures made by the Persians over the coming years met with similar replies, both on the part of the Poles and on that of other European nations. No consensus regarding a common struggle was reached.
Polish new king, Władysław IV, successor to Zygmunt III, changed his policy and he send his envoys out to countries which might conceivably be interested in joining anti-Turkish alliance. Venice and the Papal States pledged financial aid; an alliance with Moscow also seemed a real possibility, and negotiations were underway with the Cossacks. The king also dispatched an embassy to Persia. In the year 1639, Count Teofil Stahremberg spent some time at the court of the shah, endeavouring to fathom the current political situation and to gauge the chances for a joint enterprise as well as seeking protection for Polish missionaries. Diplomatic intercourse with Persia was on the upswing again, with many a delegation from Poland, Venice, and from the Pope making their way thither. In 1647, an embassy on a grand scale to Shah Abbas II (1642-1666) was headed by the nobleman Jerzy Ilicz. As with Count Stahremberg before him, the purely diplomatic aspect of Ilicz's mission was augmented with an assignment relating to a Jesuit facility in the shah's domain; while the shah declined to mount a joint initiative against the Turks, he did accord multiple privileges to the Jesuit order. The King's death in 1648 moved the spectre of war with Turkey further to the future.
Soon enough, however, it became manifest that a confrontation with the Ottomans is inevitable. After 1650, what was hereto with a stable balance of power in Central and Eastern Europe began to shift; the expansive policies pursued by Turkey as well as the absence of an agreement with Russia were generating new alliances. While the spectacular triumph of King Jan III Sobieski at Vienna temporarily checked the Turkish advance, effective counteraction of the Ottoman threat required further military measures. The Polish king believed it necessary to mount a concentric offensive against Turkey. "This is the time", he wrote, "that the ages have been leading up to, and should we neglect it, we will answer to the Lord".
While King Jan III Sobieski did conclude an alliance with Austria and with Venice under the auspices of the Pope, he also sought allies in the Muslim world. His greatest hopes were associated with Persia; in the course of his reign, no less than eleven Polish missions made their way to the court of the shah. Surely the greatest authority working in the king's diplomatic service was Bohdan Gurdziecki, a Georgian by origin. Gurdziecki remained at the court of the Persian shah for several years in the capacity of special resident and representative of the Polish king; it was him who delivered to the shah news of the victory at Vienna.
The long months of negotiations with the Persian shah, however, did not bring the hoped-for results. The envoy Zgórski and the archbishop Knab, ambassadors of the Holy League representing Poland, the Emperor, and Venice, had to return home empty-handed. In the course of a gala audience held on March 20, 1686, Shah Sulayman (1666-1694), a vacillating ruler who was very much under the sway of his viziers and who was interested in the arts much more than in politics, officially refused to participate in a joint effort against the Ottomans.
Yet the intensive diplomatic contacts were engendering dynamic development in the commercial sphere. In the course of the seventeenth century, commercial expeditions travelling directly from Poland to Persia became increasingly common, although this was by no means tantamount to a neglecting of contacts with Turkey - Poland's traditional trading partner in the East. The conflict between Poland and Turkey was one factor contributing to the increasing turnovers between Poland and Persia; another lay in the commercial policies of Shah Abbas I geared at stimulating Persian exports to India on the one side and to Europe on the other. It was with a view to such growth in trade that the shah ordered the construction of many new roads and bridges. What's more, Persian goods were generally superior to Turkish ones in craftsmanship and decoration, characteristics which could only add to their appeal. The items imported to Poland included encrusted weapons, shields, textiles, belts, tents, as well as magnificent carpets and jewellery. Many Poles engaging in commerce with Persia were of Armenian origin, and they made good use of the presence of their countrymen and relatives in this exotic land.
The establishment of diplomatic relations between Poland and Persia was initially dictated by political considerations, though undoubtedly there was another goal, namely protection over Christianity. Tolerant policy of the Safavid Shahs towards the Christians enabled the activity of Christian missions in Iran.
The first Polish Jesuit to organise, in 1654-1659, a mission in Persia was Tomasz Młodzianowski; he was well-phrased in the Persian language as well as disposing of a thorough understanding of the customs and rules in force at the Persian court. With time, the Jesuits, by gist of this very knowledge of the political situation prevailing in Persia, came to be included in embassies as advisors, envoys, and as ambassadors. Over the years of 1690-1693, two Polish monks, Jan Gostkowski and Ignacy Franciszek Zapolski, parleyed with Shah Suleyman II concerning a war with Turkey; upon returning to Poland, they provided their principal with much information about the shah's intentions and about the political situation prevailing in Persia and in the Caucasus. Their competence is borne out by the fact that King Jan III Sobieski appointed Zapolski his permanent resident at the court in Isfahan, at which he remained until his death in 1703.
Jan III Sobieski was generous in extending his support to Christian missions in Persia. In the year of 1691, he donated one thousand red złoties from his private funds to the Jesuit mission in Shamaha (now in northern Azerbaijan). He appointed the members of this mission "chaplains of the embassy of his Majesty the Polish King" and obligated them to accompany his envoys from Shamaha to Isfahan (for a period of fifty days) as well as to remain with them at the court of the shah for two months.
Particularly noteworthy among the Polish Jesuits in Persia was Tadeusz Krusiński. A consummate expert on Persia, Krusiński arrived there in 1707 and remained for well-nigh twenty years; he was an eyewitness to the downfall of the Safavid dynasty. Father Krusiński's Persian activities were not limited to the religious sphere; he also contributed significantly to the improvement of relations between the two countries. Retained at the court of Shah Hussain (1694-1722) as a translator, he produced Persian-language versions of letters arriving from various European monarchs, of treaties, and of contracts. He also maintained an archive for the use of the shah, ordering and storing documentation pertaining to religious and diplomatic missions. Held in great esteem and respect by the shah and his officials, he became - in 1720 - the procurator general of the mission.
Father Krusiński travelled extensively in the Orient. Accompanying merchant caravans as a physician, he traversed the Caucasus and Syberia; he visited Kurdistan and Turkey, Palestine and Arabia, he reached Afghanistan. Adding constantly to his knowledge about the traditions and customs of the East, he gained renown as the first European researcher of Persian history. As a witness of the tragic events such as invasion of Afghan tribes which took Isfahan in 1722 and overthrown the Safavid dynasty he recounted these in his books. In 1725 father Krusiński left Persia and travelled to Italy; it is there that he set to paper his work about the Afghan-Persian wars. It is purported that he himself translated this work into Persian; the Persian-language version was put out in Istanbul in 1730 by the first Turkish printing shop, that of Ibrahim Müteferrik.
Polish Jesuits, who enjoyed the Shah's respect and esteem of his officials, helped towards the strengthening of mutual contacts. They were interrupted by a civil war in Iran that was ignited by the Afghan troops onslaught. Soon after, the partition of Poland, too, contributed to the stoppage of the exchange of envoys. The last Polish mission headed for Persia in 1712 under the leadership of Stanisław Chomentowski, Poland's last envoy to that country. Although, ultimately, despite prolonged contacts and negotiations, no common actions were undertaken by Poland and Persia, nevertheless traces of former closeness have been preserved for good in culture and art. Thought no consensus regarding a common struggle was reached, the diplomatic relations between two countries Poland and Persia laid their fundaments and therefore opened the course of their history.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)